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OPTION PRICING IN AN IMPERFECT WORLD
GIANLUCA CASSESE
Abstract. In a model with no given probability measure, we consider asset pricing in the presence
of frictions and other imperfections and characterize the property of coherent pricing, a notion
related to (but much weaker than) the no arbitrage property. We show that prices are coherent if
and only if the set of pricing measures is non empty, i.e. if pricing by expectation is possible. We
then obtain a decomposition of coherent prices highlighting the role of bubbles. Eventually we show
that under very weak conditions the coherent pricing of options allows for a very clear representation
from which it is possible, as in the original work of Breeden and Litzenberger, to extract the implied
probability. Eventually we test this conclusion empirically via a new non parametric approach.
1. Introduction
It is unanimous the opinion that over the last decades the theory of finance has produced an
impressive number of beautiful results, particularly in asset pricing. At the same time asset pricing
has originated a vast empirical literature with special attention accorded to testing the classical
conclusion of Breeden and Litzenberger [13] and Banz and Miller [4] – namely that option prices
contain valuable information on the risk neutral density. Thus, many authors incline to believe
that the beauty of modern finance, theoretical or applied, lies in the fact that the crucial property
of risk neutral pricing rests ultimately on the simple and sound tenet that a market populated by
rational economic agents admits no arbitrage opportunities.
Notwithstanding the general opinion, the proof of the claim that absence of arbitrage implies risk
neutral pricing, a result known in the literature as the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, has
long been a challenge for mathematical economists, from Harrison and Kreps [40] and Kreps [51] to
Delbaen and Schachermayer [23]. This key result requires in fact a much more stringent condition
than absence of arbitrage, requiring implicitly that agents have the ability of evaluating prospective
profits from trading in a way that involves a high degree of probabilistic sophistication. Financial
models are then an adequate description of markets populated by individuals whose decision process
is dominated by probability assessments. A convincing amount of empirical observations seems,
however, to document that the attitude of investors towards uncertainty is not easy to reconcile with
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probabilistic rationality but rather generates puzzles which contrast with some of the principles of
financial theory.
In asset pricing models probabilistic sophistication gets along with the sophistication of investors
in keeping up with portfolio policies which prescribe to rebalance at a continuous pace. On the
side of trading, the wedge between financial models and real markets is even more apparent as a
consequence of the general neglect accorded by most models to all sorts of market imperfections,
such as bid/ask spreads, transaction costs or restrictions to trade. Some easily observed facts, such
as those documented by Lamont and Thaler in [52] and [53], or the high ratio of option prices
violating some basic no arbitrage condition, become then difficult challenges for financial theory.
The contribution of this work to the asset pricing literature lies in the choice to describe the
market mechanism under a minimal set of assumptions and yet obtain useful characterizations of
financial prices and testable restrictions. A distinguishing feature of this model, first appeared
in [16] (and, more recently, considered by Riedel [60]), is the absence of a given reference proba-
bility measure which is replaced here with a qualitative description of how agents rank uncertain
outcomes. As in the tradition of subjective probability, we believe that probabilities should be
regarded more as the outcome of choice than as an input to it.
Another distinguishing feature of the present paper is the description of the market mechanism.
Not only we consider bid/ask spreads and (to a minor extent) fixed trading costs but we also allow
for several additional restrictions to trade. First, agents may be prevented from forming portfolios
of arbitrarily large size, so that it may not be possible to run money pumps – in case they exist.
Arbitrage phenomena may thus have a minor impact on economic equilibrium and the no arbitrage
principle looses, as a consequence, part of its appeal. Second, not all portfolios may be shorted,
and not just as a result of trading restrictions. In the presence of credit risk, taking long or short
positions should be considered as two separate investments given that the implicit level of risk
depends on the reliability of the investor playing the short side. Third, we do not identify assets
with their payoff so that it is possible to have two assets promising the same payoff at different
prices. Fourth, the opportunity to invest in some asset may be available only if combined with
other assets. Some risky positions are in fact possible only if a convenient level of collateral is put
up. The impact of margins when shorting options, an empirical fact accommodated in our model,
has rarely been considered in asset pricing.
Eventually, we don’t assume the existence of a riskless asset but rather of a nume´raire whose non
negative payoff is used as the discount factor. In contrast with the basic principles of neoclassical
economics, the choice of the nume´raire, given the absence of a reference probability, is non neutral
and an arbitrage opportunity arising with a given nume´raire may no longer be such with a different
discount factor. This point has a clear interpretation from the point of view of risk management
and is also discussed by El-Karoui and Ravanelli [30].
In the framework outlined above we discuss three distinct, increasingly restrictive notions of
market rationality: coherence, efficiency and absence of arbitrage opportunities. We obtain in
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Theorem 3 a characterization of coherent prices in terms of a set of pricing measures. Our result
is near in spirit to that obtained in the pioneering work of Jouini and Kallal [47] (in an L2(P )
setting) but departs from it is several ways. First, pricing measures can only be applied to claims
with limited discounted losses; second, they in our model are just finitely additive. We obtain
in Theorem 4 exact necessary and sufficient conditions for countable additivity which justify the
conclusion that this additional property should be regarded more as a mathematical artifact than an
economic implication. In Theorem 5 we obtain a decomposition of coherent prices which highlights
the role of bubbles. It is also possible to represent pricing measures with a capacity, similarly to
what assumed in the work of Chateauneuf et al. [19]. The connection between with capacities is
also explored in Cerreia-Vioglio et al. [18].
Of course, over the years several authors have investigated restrictions to trading similar to
those considered here. The first contribution is probably due to Demsetz [25] who represents the
transaction mechanism not differently from the production process and interprets its costs as the
reward of a corresponding input. Leaving aside the microstructure literature, in which transaction
costs are the heart of the matter (see Hasbrouck [41], Huang and Stoll [44] and Stoll [65] for a
small sample), there has been a number of papers, from the pioneering work of Hahn [38] to the
more recent one of Bisin [7], trying to incorporate transaction costs into general equilibrium. In
these studies transaction costs act as a limit to the opportunity of exploiting potential arbitrage
profits and contribute to restoring equilibrium. In modern financial theory the first papers on the
matter have been those of Bensaid, Lesne, Pages and Scheinkman [5] and, most of all, of Jouini
and Kallal [47]. More recent papers include Bouchard [12], Napp [58] (who first models trading
restrictions via closed convex cones), Jouini and Napp [48] (who describe investments as cash flows
with convex cone constraints and assume no nume´raire), Kabanov and Stricker [49] (who consider
very general forms of costs) and Schachermayer [62]. With no claim to completeness, one should
also mention the work of Amihud and Mendelson [3], Dermody and Prisman [26], Prisman [59]
and, most recently, Roux [61].
A limit intrinsic to this literature is that, with the noticeable exception of Luttmer [56] (who
extends the classical conclusions of Hansen and Jagannathan [39]), none of the preceding papers
produces testable restrictions. Aiming at applications, we focus then on the options market where
trading is for the most part anonymous and our preceding results assume, as a consequence, a more
tractable form. Our aim is to repropose the classical exercise of Breeden and Litzenberger [13] and
of Banz and Miller [4]. A large number of papers have addressed this issue, particularly with non
parametric techniques (see e.g. [1], [2], [46] and [68]). All of these papers, however, start assuming
that the options market is efficient and free of arbitrage opportunities and need as a consequence
a preliminary, careful filtering of the data. We highlight that, despite being generally overlooked,
this first step is likely to induce a selection bias in estimates.
In our setting assuming efficiency of option prices is unnecessary. We prove in Theorem 7 that for
each convex family of derivatives it is possible to extract an implicit, countably additive measure
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associated with its superhedging price; in Lemma 6 we show how to implement this conclusion
numerically. Thus, despite the weak starting assumptions and the potential role of bubbles, our
result is surprisingly near to that of Breeden and Litzenberger.
We elaborate then a non parametric, two step procedure to estimate the probability implicit
in option prices. In the first step, we construct a set of artificial derivatives whose payoff is (i)
as smooth as required and (ii) approximates the option payoff uniformly. A control parameter,
playing conceptually the same role as the bandwidth in kernel regression, calibrates smoothness vs
goodness of fit. Second, we obtain for these derivatives the implied efficient price, which represents
our non parametric estimate. The implied probability is then, as usual, simply the derivative
of this newly obtained price with respect to the parameter playing the role of the strike price.
Differently from other non parametric approaches – the kernel approach of Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo [2],
the local polynomial methodology of Aı¨t-Sahalia and Duarte [1] or the constrained least squares
approximation of Yatchew and Ha¨rdle [68] – is that we do not perform smoothing of the option
prices but rather of their payoff and compute the corresponding price via superhedging. We show
that with an accurate choice of the smoothing parameter and even if taking into explicit account
sample selection effects, our estimates have desirable convergence properties. We conclude with
some empirical analyses on simulated as well as historical datasets.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we describe the market and the trading mecha-
nism. It is introduced and briefly discussed the notion of a negligible event which is crucial to our
approach. In section 3 we discuss the properties of coherence, efficiency and of absence of arbitrage
and, in the following section 4, we obtain an explicit characterization of coherent prices in terms
of pricing measures. In section 5 we develop a decomposition of coherent asset prices from which
emerges the existence of bubbles. We then move to option markets in section 6 where we prove
a general representation for prices of convex derivatives, involving bubbles and an implicit pricing
measure. In the following section 7 we propose our econometric strategy and prove some properties
of the estimator obtained. In the concluding section 8, we illustrate some empirical investigations
using Monte Carlo simulations as well as market data.
Throughout the paper we adopt the following mathematical symbols and conventions. F(X)
denotes the collection of real-valued functions on some space X and F0(X) designates those f ∈
F(X) whose support {x ∈ X : f(x) 6= 0} is a finite set. At times, we prefer fx to f(x). If f ∈ F(X)
and if −X ⊂ X, the symbol f c will be used to denote the conjugate of f , that is the element of
F(X) defined implicitly by letting
(1) f c(x) = −f(−x) x ∈ X
We set conventionally 0/0 = 0, inf ∅ =∞ and ∑∅ = 0. R denotes the extended real numbers.
2. Markets, Prices, Investors
Assets traded on the market are identified with a “ticker”, α ∈ A, and are associated with a
corresponding payoff, X(α). The latter is modeled simply as a function on some given space Ω, i.e.
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an element of F(Ω). No mathematical structure is imposed on the set of traded payoffs, neither
topological nor measure theoretic. Although it is natural to interpret Ω as the sample space and
X(θ) as a random quantity (and thus to attribute to our model an intrinsic static nature) we may
as well choose Ω = S×R+, with S the sample space and R+ the time domain and thus give to our
construction a full fledge dynamical structure.
2.1. Trading Strategies. Investors trade claims by taking a finite number of either long or short
positions, in respect of the restrictions imposed by the market. A trading rule is then just an
element of the space F0(A). The trading rule which consists solely of one unit of the claim α ∈ A
will be denoted by δα. To each trading rule θ corresponds the final gain
(2) X(θ) =
∑
α∈A
θ(α)X(α)
Of course, X(δα) = X(α).
Inspired by real markets, one may imagine several restrictions to asset trading, further to the
constraints of respecting the balance of budget and of forming finite portfolios. These include short
selling prohibitions or margin requirements and others that ultimately guarantee the enforcement
of some form of bound to losses and, possibly, to prevent investors from taking positions too large.
The symbol Θ, that denotes hereafter the set of all admissible trades, specifies all restrictions to
asset trading. We assume the following:
Assumption 1. Θ is a convex subset of F0(A) containing the origin.
Under Assumption 1 investors need not be permitted to take positions of either sign, long or short.
This is consistent with the restriction to losses recalled above. Moreover, investors may encounter
restrictions in the choice of the scale of the investment. On this point we depart significantly from
much of the literature on asset pricing with or without transaction costs, see e.g. [47], [49] or [56].
A possible relaxation of this restriction is to allow λθ ∈ Θ for all λ ≥ 0 whenever θ ∈ Θ satisfies
X(θ) ≥ 0. A major implication of this is that arbitrage opportunities, when available, may not
have a disruptive impact on market equilibrium and the no arbitrage principle, as a consequence,
may no longer be crucial. Eventually, we do not require that δα ∈ Θ, i.e. that each asset may be
traded individually due, e.g., to the requirement of putting up margins when taking positions on
derivatives markes.
2.2. Prices. For each α ∈ A we denote by qa(α) and qb(α) its ask and bid price respectively.
Assumption 2. The functions qa, qb ∈ F(A) are such that qa(α) ≥ qb(α) for all α ∈ A.
We highlight that in our model financial prices are defined independently of the asset payoff but
depend rather on the asset name. This apparently innocuous detail makes our approach compatible
with some of the pricing anomalies observed on markets by which the trading of one same asset at
different market locations or simply under different names, may produce different prices (see the
examples on close-end funds or of twin stocks reported in Lamont and Thaler [53]).
6 GIANLUCA CASSESE
In order to form a given trading strategy θ ∈ Θ an investor pays an ask price for each long
position and earns a bid price for each short one. The corresponding cost amounts thus to
(3) q(θ) =
∑
α∈A
[
θ(α)+qa(α)− θ(α)−qb(α)
]
θ ∈ Θ
It is clear that q(δα) = q
a(α) and, if −δα ∈ Θ, that qc(δα) = −q(−δα) = qb(α).
The basic assumption behind (3) is that each position in a portfolio is priced separately. This is in
accordance with trading anonymity prevailing in specialist markets but is certainly not an adequate
description of OTC trading. Options markets, on which we shall focus in the last sections, are quite
well represented by (3) at least for orders which fall below the size limits of the market maker. Large
orders, instead, are in general processed on a separate track and the price is set ad hoc.
Market frictions include, further to the bid/ask spread, also some fixed costs, such as brokerage
fees, which are paid by investors to have access to markets. Given that on each market investors
may trade more than one asset, we may thus think of markets as a partition M of subsets of A and
for each M ∈M we designate by c(M) ≥ 0 the corresponding fixed cost. For example, all options on
a given underlying are traded on the same market, independently of the strike or maturity so that
any option strategy will involve the same fees. Thus the fixed cost associated with an investment
strategy is
(4) c(θ) =
∑
{M∈M:supα∈M |θ(α)|>0}
c(M) θ ∈ Θ
A realistic modeling fixed trading costs turns out to be quite difficult due to their extremely various
nature1. (4) is just one possible model.
The total cost associated with a trading strategy θ amounts to
(5) t(θ) = q(θ) + c(θ) θ ∈ Θ
It is easy to deduce from (3) and (5) some elementary properties:
Lemma 1. The functional q ∈ F(Θ) defined in (3) is (i) positively homogeneous, (ii) subadditive
and (iii) such that
(6) q(f + g) = q(f) + q(g) for all f, g ∈ Θ with fg ≥ 0
The functional t ∈ F(Θ) defined in (5) is subadditive and satisfies t(0) = 0.
In many a paper on asset pricing with frictions, starting with the seminal paper of Jouini and
Kallal [47], subadditivity is the only distinguishing feature characterizing the existence of bid/ask
spreads. Another paper following this choice is that of Luttmer [56]. In Chateauneuf et al. [19],
the pricing functional is represented via a capacity and is then not only subadditive but even
comonotonic, a property somehow akin to (6). In these papers an explicit description of the costs
of trading is omitted (a remarkable exception is [49]) and in so doing, we claim, one risks to miss
1 As a matter of fact transaction fees tend to be stepwise increasing with the order size rather then fixed.
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important details of the price mechanism and to mix up effects that may actually originate from
different sources, e.g. bounded rationality or restrictions to market participation. We will refer to
property (6) as anonymity and, although in the following Theorems 3 through 5 this plays no role,
it will be important when dealing with option prices for which, we believe, it is perfectly adequate.
2.3. The Nume´raire Asset. Financial models (with the noteworthy exception of [48]) commonly
assume the existence of a riskless asset, often interpreted as a bond, that may equally well serve
the purpose of borrowing or lending. This assumption plays three distinct roles. First, it enables
agents to move wealth back and forth in time in a safe way and thus provides a firm basis to define
the present value of future wealth. Second, it allows to identify explicitly the nume´raire of the
economy, removing the arbitrariness that arises whenever several assets may play that same role.
Third, if the investment in the bond is unrestricted then this asset plays a residual role in portfolio
models, guaranteeing the effectiveness of portfolio constraints.
This assumption is however not only strongly counterfactual but more troublesome than it ap-
pears at first sight. First, if the bond is not fully free of risk but just evolves in a predictable
way (as is often the case in continuous time models) then the role of the discounting asset is no
longer neutral as its implicit risk entwines with the one originating from the underlying asset. El
Karoui and Ravanelli [30] discuss this point at length and show that risk measures are affected by
discounting in a significant way, when the discount factor is risky. Moreover, in equilibrium models,
such as those considering the role of noise trading (see [24] or [63]), the riskless nature of the bond
may not survive Walras law unless its elasticity of supply is infinite2. Eventually if investors are
prone to credit risk one should consider borrowing and lending as two different financial contracts,
given that the final payoff is ultimately a function of the reliability of the two intervening parts.
We summarize the preceding discussion in the following:
Assumption 3. There exists α0 ∈ A such that (i) 1 ≥ X(α0) > 0, (ii) if θ ∈ Θ then θ+ λδα0 ∈ Θ
if and only if λ ≥ 0, (iii) c(δα0) = 0, (iv) q0 > 0.
We shall refer to α0 as the nume´raire asset and simplify δα0 , X(α0) and q(α0) as δ0, X0, q0.
Assumption 3.(i) is fairly general to allow for virtually all sorts of dynamics but it excludes the
occurrence of default with no recovery value. If one visualizes the nume´raire asset as government
bonds one may perhaps consider this restriction not too far from reality given that in market
economies government bonds have always been redeemed at some positive value. Alternatively,
identifying the nume´raire asset with the bank account one may argue, likewise, that the bank
account is in most countries assisted by some form of deposit insurance, maybe just in the form
of the role of lender of last resort played by the Central Bank. As in the real world, in our model
investors are unrestricted in deciding the amount to invest in the nume´raire asset, but they cannot
take negative positions as this would more appropriately be considered a different asset, as argued
2See the criticisms to this assumption made by Lowenstein and Willard [55].
8 GIANLUCA CASSESE
above. Property (iii) may perhaps be seen as the outcome of competition among banks, while (iv)
justifies referring to α0 as the nume´raire.
We define normalized payoffs as
(7) X¯(θ) = X(θ)/X0
2.4. Evaluating random quantities. An agent’s decision to invest in a given trading strategy
θ ∈ Θ is motivated, we assume, by the payoff X(θ) that it generates. However, a full description of
this quantity for each possible future state ω ∈ Ω is perhaps a satisfactory mathematical approach
but not necessarily a correct model of how random quantities are evaluated. In other words,
economic agents do not regard future outcomes as functions but rather as equivalence classes.
This is clearly the case in expected utility theory and, more generally, in all models in which
choice is based on a probability judgment. Equivalence, however, is not only a positive conclusion
emerging from an accurate probabilistic assessment, as the classical model implicitly suggests. It
often emerges from the inability of individuals to fully compare events or from their attitude to
focus attention on scenarios selectively, a fact often documented in empirical decision theory and
experimental psychology, and often arising in the form of market exuberance or of overly pessimistic
evaluation of risky assets.
According to a well known study by Kahneman and Tversky [50, p. 282], “people are limited
in their ability to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities” and are lead, as a consequence,
to ignore highly unlikely events in order to simplify decision problems. Moreover, due to what the
authors call the isolation effect (p. 271), in comparing alternatives people “disregard components
that the alternatives share and focus on the components that distinguish them”. The same idea has
been taken up more recently by Bordalo, Gennaioli and Shleifer [10] according to whom decision
weights distort probabilities by focusing on salient states, i.e. those outcomes on which lotteries
differ most. Here too the authors suggest that decisions are made by processing only part of the
available information, ultimately, in response to the limits encountered in facing the complexity
often implicit in uncertainty3. Gennaioli, Bordalo and Schleifer [11] explore the asset pricing im-
plications of this approach to uncertainty, contributing to explain some known puzzles such as
preference for skewness and the growth-value puzzle.
This stream of ideas suggests us to treat the equivalence among random quantities, i.e. elements
of F(Ω), as a primitive element and to model it via a binary relation ≥∗ on F(Ω). We assume to
this end4:
Assumption 4. The binary relation ≥∗ on F(Ω) satisfies the following properties for f, g ∈ F(Ω):
(i) f ≥∗ g if and only if f − g ≥∗ 0; (ii) f ≥ 0 implies f ≥∗ 0; (iii) f + 2−n ≥∗ 0 for n = 1, 2, . . .
implies f ≥∗ 0; (iv) f, g ≥∗ 0 and a, b ≥ 0 imply af + bg ≥∗ 0; (v) f ≥∗ 0 and A ⊂ Ω imply
f1A ≥∗ 0.
3 Gennaioli and Shleifer [36] refer to this kind of decision making process as local thinking.
4 We reserve the notation f ≥ g, f ∨ g, f ∧ g or |f | to pointwise ordering.
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All of these properties are self explaining, save (iii) which states that the conclusion f ≥∗ 0
follows whenever, for all practical purposes, f may be replaced with a quantity which satisfies this
criterion.
We present some examples in which this binary relation and its properties are easily interpreted.
Example 1 (Certainty and probability). One may let ≥∗ reflect certainty – by identifying f ≥∗ g
with f ≥ g – or probabilistic sophistication – if, given a (countably additive) probability P , we define
f ≥∗ g to mean P (f ≥ g) = 1. In either case Assumption 4 is trivially satisfied.
Example 2 (Negligible events). In [16] an ideal N of subsets of Ω was introduced as a model of
those sets that agents consider as negligible. Then the relationship “f ≥ g up to negligibility” was
defined to mean that {f − g < −η} ∈ N for all η > 0. It is clear that such partial order satisfies
Assumption 4. The notion of a negligible set seems to capture part of the evidence emerging from
the above discussion and is best exemplified in the context of partial information. Investments
involving a substantial level of credit risk are often evaluated on the basis of some external report
on creditworthiness. Although the importance of credit rating is generally fully perceived, the risk of
misreporting by the external analysts, originating e.g. from conflict of interests, is often overlooked.
Example 3 (Qualitative probability). In his pioneering work on subjective probability, de Finetti
[22] introduced the idea of qualitative probability i.e. to model the judgment “event A is more likely
than B” as a binary relation, A  B satisfying the axioms: (a) completeness, (b) transitivity, (c)
Ω  A  ∅ for all events A and (d) if C∩A = C∩B = ∅ then A  B if and only if A∪C  B∪C.
If f ∈ F(Ω) then one may define
(8) f ≥∗ g if and only if A ∩ {f − g > −η}  A for all A ⊂ Ω
It is easily proved that the above Assumption 4 holds.
Example 4 (Cash-subadditive risk measure). Let ρ : F(Ω) → R be a cash-subadditive, coherent
risk measure (as defined by El-Karoui and Ravanelli [30, Definition 3.1, p. 568]) so that ρ is (a)
positively homogeneous, (b) subadditive, (c) inversely monotone (i.e. f ≤ g implies ρ(f) ≥ ρ(g))
and such that (d) ρ(f + α) ≥ ρ(f)− α when α ∈ R. Then one may define
(9) f ≥∗ 0 if and only if ρc(f1A) ≥ 0 for all A ⊂ Ω
Upon noting that necessarily ρ(0) = 0, it is easily verified that (9) satisfies Assumption 4.
We also define f >∗ g to mean that f ≥∗ g but g 6≥∗ f (so that f >∗ g if and only if f − g >∗ 0)
and f =∗ g whenever f ≥∗ g and g ≥∗ f . Eventually we define (with the convention sup∅ = −∞)
(10) f∗ = sup{α ∈ R : f − α ≥∗ 0} and f∗ = −(−f)∗
The following facts about the partial order introduced above should be noted:
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Lemma 2. The binary relation ≥∗ defines a partial order on F(Ω). Moreover, (i) f ≥∗ 0 if and
only if f∗ ≥ 0; (ii) f >∗ 0 if and only if f∗ ≥ 0 and f∗ > 0; (iii) if f ≥∗ 0, b ≥ 0 and b is bounded
then bf ≥∗ 0; (iv) if f =∗ 0 then |f | =∗ 0; (v) f ≥∗ 0 implies 1{f<−η} =∗ 0 for all η > 0; (vi) if
a ∈ R then (f + a)∗ = f∗ + a and (f + a)∗ = f∗ + a.
Lemma 2.(iii) together with Assumption 3.(i) leads to the conclusion that X¯ ≥∗ 0 implies
X ≥∗ 0 but the converse need not be true. This complication is a special feature of our model
and, notwithstanding the mathematical difficulties it involves, it highlights the role of discounting
in determining the overall level of risk. The statement X ≥∗ 0, in fact, does not exclude losses
but rather that losses larger than η are ignored, for any η or, yet in other words, that losses may
considered as arbitrarily small. The statement X¯ ≥∗ 0 means, on the other hand, that losses from
X may be hedged away by investing an arbitrarily small amount in the nume´raire asset. However,
if the nume´raire asset does not guarantee a minimum payoff the arbitrarily small losses associated
with θ may require a potentially unbounded amount of the nume´raire asset in order to be hedged.
The problem arises whenever losses occur jointly with a low value for X0, as is often the case during
financial crises. We stress that the choice of the nume´raire has risk management implications, a
fact first noted by El-Karoui and Ravanelli [30] and central to their discussion of the cash additivity
property of risk measures. The impact of random nume´raires on risk measures is also discussed in
Filipovic [33].
The symbol ba∗ (resp. P∗) will henceforth denote the family of finitely additive set functions m
(resp. probabilities) defined on all subsets of Ω and such that f ∈ L1(m) and ∫ |f |dm = 0 whenever
f =∗ 0. We also define
B∗ = {f ∈ F(Ω) : η ≥∗ |f | for some η > 0} and N∗ = {A ⊂ Ω : 1A =∗ 0}(11)
Remark that f ≥∗ 0 implies {f < −η} ∈ N∗ for all η > 0 but the converse is not true.
3. Coherence, Efficiency and Arbitrage
The basic tenet of financial economics is the assumption that markets do not permit arbitrage
opportunities and it is the purpose of this section to discuss this fundamental principle in the
current framework. In fact, if there is agreement on the general statement of such principle, its
translation into a convenient mathematical notion is much less uncontroversial. Definitions vary
from one another mainly for what concerns the ambient space, the choice been in general, since
Harrison and Kreps [40], some topological space, often Lp, assuming the existence of an exogenously
given probability measure.
Given the preceding discussion we propose the following definition:
Definition 1. A functional φ ∈ F(Θ) is said to be coherent (with the no arbitrage principle) if
X¯(θ) ≥∗ 0 implies φ(θ) ≥ 0; φ is said to be efficient if θ, θ′ ∈ Θ and X¯(θ) ≥∗ X¯(θ′) imply
φ(θ) ≥ φ(θ′). Moreover, θ ∈ Θ is an arbitrage opportunity for φ if
(12) X¯(θ) ≥∗ 0 but φ(θ) ≤ 0
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and at least one of the two inequalities is strict.
Although with no restrictions to short selling and a linear pricing functional they are equivalent
properties, in the general case coherence is weaker then efficiency and it does not guarantee absence
of arbitrage per se but it only excludes immediate arbitrage, i.e. the opportunity to earn money
immediately with only negligible losses in the future. It is still possible, with a coherent pricing
functional, that an investment which yields a strictly positive (discounted) payoff is sold for free.
Coherence is thus a rather basic financial property and we shall investigate it in depth.
The inequality X¯(θ) ≥∗ 0 may be rephrased in terms of the minimal amount ρ(θ) to be invested
in the nume´raire asset in order to hedge losses away (if possible). Formally5,
(13) ρ(θ) = inf{c > 0 : X¯(θ + cδ0) ≥∗ 0} = (−X¯(θ)∗) ∨ 0
By Assumption 3.(ii), θ + ρ(θ)δ0 ∈ Θ if and only if ρ(θ) < ∞ or, equivalently, if θ belongs to the
set of hedgeable strategies
(14) Θ∗ =
{
θ : X¯(θ)∗ > −∞
}
In fact regulated markets do not allow investors to enter positions with unlimited potential losses
so that Θ∗ is often considered as the set of all reasonable investment strategies – see [23] where a
condition akin to θ ∈ Θ∗ is the basis for the concept of free lunch with vanishing risk.
The following are some elementary properties:
Lemma 3. The functional ρ defined in (13) satisfies (i) positive homogeneity, (ii) subadditivity,
(iii) X¯(θ) ≥∗ X¯(θ′) implies ρ(θ) ≤ ρ(θ′), (iv) ρ(θ) = 0 if and only if X¯(θ)∗ ≥ 0 and (v)
(15) ρ(θ + aδ0) ≥ ρ(θ)− a for all θ ∈ Θ and a ≥ 0
Moreover,
(16) ρ(θ) = sup
{∫
(−X¯(θ) ∨ 0)dµ : µ ∈ P∗
}
If φ : Θ→ R+ possesses properties (iv)–(v) above, then φ ≤ ρ.
In other words, ρ is a coherent, cash subadditive risk measure on Θ6 and ρ(θ + ρ(θ)δ0) = 0.
Theorem 1. Assume that θ + λδ0 ∈ Θ for every λ > 0 and θ ∈ Θ∗. The total cost functional t
defined in (5) is coherent if and only if
(17) t(θ) + q0ρ(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ
It admits no arbitrage opportunity if it satisfies
(18) t(θ) + q0ρ(θ) > 0 for all θ ∈ Θ such that X¯(θ)∗ + ρ(θ) > 0
5The first equality in (13) is a definition; the second one is easily established.
6However the basic intuition used by El-Karoui and Ravanelli to justify cash subadditivity (namely that the
discount factor is less than 1, see [30, p. 568]) does not apply as we do not impose X0 ≥∗ 1.
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As usual, the absence of arbitrage opportunities implies no a priori bound on the price of claims
with potentially unbounded losses as these cannot be combined in a strategy generating a ≥∗ non
negative discounted payoff. Likewise, we have no upper bound on prices as a consequence of short
selling prohibitions.
By adding convexity to fixed costs we obtain:
Theorem 2. Suppose that the cost functional c in (4) is convex. Then t is coherent if and only if
there exists µ ∈ P∗ such that
(19) t(θ) ≥ q0
∫ (
X¯(θ) ∧ 0) dµ for all θ ∈ Θ∗
The assumption that t is convex is crucial to prove Theorem 2 but is hard to justify based on
the available empirical evidence which suggests, contrariwise, that fixed costs increase less than
proportionally.
4. Coherent Pricing
Since the early work of Bensaid et al [5] it is known that many properties of asset prices are
revealed by the super hedging functional and our model is no exception. We adapt this concept in
defining the following extended real valued functional:
(20) pi(f) = inf
{
λq(θ) : λX¯(θ) ≥∗ f, λ ≥ 0, θ ∈ Θ
}
f ∈ F(Ω)
Clearly, pi(1) ≤ q0 and pic(1) ≥ 0; if, in addition, q is coherent, then pi(0) = 0 and pic(f) ≤ pi(f) for
all f ∈ F(Ω) – see Lemma 9. But even with coherence we cannot exclude the somehow abnormal
situations pi(1) = 0 and pic(1) = 0 (see Example 6 below). In particular:
Lemma 4. pic(1) = 0 if and only if q(θ) ≥ 0 for every θ ∈ Θ∗.
Define
(21) K = {f ∈ F(Ω) : pi(|f |) <∞} and K∗ = {f ∈ K : f∗ > −∞}
The set K plays in this paper the role of the ambient space, similarly to Lp(P ) in the traditional
setting. It should be stressed that its definition is entirely endogenous and market based and does
not require the introduction of any mathematical structure.
The following is the most important result of this section.
Theorem 3. The price functional q is coherent if and only if for each h ∈ B∗ the set
(22) M =
{
m ∈ ba∗,+ : K ⊂ L(m) and
∫
fdm ≤ pi(f) for all f ∈ K∗
}
contains an element mh such that
∫
hdmh = pi(h).
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Abusing slightly the terminology introduced in [16], we refer toM as the set of pricing measures,
traditionally represented as stochastic discount factors. One immediately deduces from Theorem 3
that M is a convex set and that
(23)
{∫
hdm : m ∈M
}
= [pic(h), pi(h)] for all h ∈ B∗
If the nume´raire is traded with no bid/ask spread and short positions are allowed then {‖m‖ : m ∈
M } = {q0}.
As in other papers in this field, Theorem 3 asserts that a coherent price system is consistent with
a linear pricing rule, i.e. a pricing rule appropriate for a market free of imperfections, namely
(24) qm(θ) ≡
∫
X¯(θ)dm ≥ qc(θ) for some m ∈M and all θ ∈ Θ∗
This conclusion somehow supports the view expressed in the microstructure literature that the bid
and ask prices are set starting from a frictionless, linear price, the consensus price. It does not
justify, as we shall argue later on, the common practice of overcoming market structure issues by
computing mid prices.
Given the exclusive emphasis of the literature on countably additive pricing measures, in the next
result we characterize the additional assumptions needed to this end.
Theorem 4. Let pic(1) > 0 and A be a σ algebra including N . Write Pc∗(A ) = {m ∈ P∗ :
m is countably additive on A }. The following are equivalent:
(i) M admits µ 6= 0 which is countably additive in restriction to A ;
(ii) there exists P ∈ Pc∗(A ) such that for all sequences 〈xn〉n∈N in R and 〈fn〉n∈N in S (A ), (a)
pi(1)xn + pi(fn) ≤ 0,(b) xn → x ≥ 0 and (c)
∫ |fn − f |dP → 0 imply ∫ fdP ≤ −x;
(iii) there is P ∈ Pc∗(A ) such that for all sequence 〈fn〉n∈N in S (A )+, limn
∫
fndP = 0 implies
limn pi
c(fn) = 0.
Theorem 4 may be established without assuming pic(1) > 0 upon replacing pi with
piε(b) = sup
{∫
bdm : m ∈M , m(Ω) ≥ ε
}
ε−1 b ∈ B∗
The statement would however be less clear to interpret. Property (iii) clarifies that countable
additivity requires some form of continuity of market prices with respect to the L1(P ) norm, a
property which has to be assumed exogenously. Condition (ii) in Theorem 4 is a specially weak
version of the familiar No-Free-Lunch (NFL) of Kreps [51] which however, involves here only simple
functions and does not require a pre assigned ambient space.
Theorem 4 provides some insight as well, suggesting cases in which M may not admit countably
additive elements.
Example 5. Let Ω be a separable metric space and A its Borel σ algebra. Assume that there
exists an increasing net 〈Nα〉α∈A in N∗ with Nα open and Ω =
⋃
αNα. Fix P ∈ Pc(A ). By
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[8, Proposition 7.2.2], 1 = limα P (Nα) = limk P (Nk) for some suitable sequence 〈Nk〉k∈N from
〈Nα〉α∈A. Set fk = 1Nck . Then, limk
∫
fkdP = 0 while
pic(fk) = inf
m∈M
m(N ck) = inf
m∈M
m(Ω) = pic(1)
so that condition (ii) of Theorem 4 fails. No pricing measure is then countably additive outside of
the special case pic(1) = 0. Actually, decomposing each m ∈M as m = mc+m⊥, with mc countably
additive and m⊥ purely finitely additive (see [28, III.7.8]), and exploiting the inclusion M ⊂ ba∗,
we conclude that all pricing measures are purely finitely additive.
The special situation illustrated in Example 5 highlights that countable additivity of the pricing
measures may not only fail but actually contrast with coherence if the partial order ≥∗ is an a
priori of the model.
5. Decompositions of Coherent Prices
Based on the results of the preceding section, we develop here some decompositions of coherent
price functionals which highlight the role of asset bubbles.
Theorem 5. The price q is coherent if and only if the set M of pricing measures is the unique
non empty, convex, weak∗ compact subset of ba∗ admitting the decomposition
(25) pi(f) = β(f) + sup
m∈M
∫
fdm for all f ∈ K
where β : K → R vanishes on B∗.
For each m ∈ M the quantity ∫ X¯(θ)dm is rightfully interpreted as the fundamental value of
the portfolio θ given m. In order to overcome the arbitrariness implicit in having a multiplicity
of possible pricing measures and obtain an unambiguous definition, it is correct to identify the
fundamental value of θ with the quantity
(26) sup
m∈M
∫
X¯(θ)dm =
∫
X¯(θ)dγ
where on the right hand side we used the representation of a supremum of integrals as the Choquet
integral with respect to a supermodular capacity γ havingM as its core7. Differently from classical
asset pricing formulas, the fundamental value is not linear here, due to transaction costs. It could be
interpreted as the maximum price paid for θ in an economy identical with the one considered above
but with no transaction costs. The main point is not only the multiplicity of pricing measures,
which would be prevalent even in an economy with incomplete financial markets, but rather the
fact that the intervening expectations do not agree on the set of traded payoffs so that the integral
appearing in (26) is not invariant with respect to the choice of m ∈M .
In general, deviations of prices from fundamental values are interpreted in the literature as evi-
dence of the existence of bubbles. See [20], [45] or [54] for examples of models dealing with bubbles
7 The use of capacities in finance was introduced by Chateauneuf et al. [19, Theorem 1.1] precisely with the aim
of modeling transaction costs. In their paper, however, this representation is an assumption (see also [18]).
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in continuous time. In so doing, however, inefficiency phenomena and the potential contribution of
asset bubbles to an efficient pricing are mixed together.
Inefficiency is measured by the quantity q(θ)−pi(X¯(θ)). The empirical literature typically reports
a relatively large number of violations, e.g., of the PUT/CALL parity, by which, say, a CALL option
may be replaced by a less costly synthetic constructed using the corresponding PUT, future and
riskless asset. Luttmer [56], takes this mispricing as the source of subadditivity. For a coherent
price system inefficiencies are a consequence of the restrictions which prevent investors to exploit
them to obtain immediate profits. Empirical explanations, such as those invoked by Lamont and
Thaler [52], draw attention on the fixed costs of trading which impair the arbitrage profits emerging
from considering prices only. However, even fixed transaction costs would play virtually no role if
investors were not somehow constrained in their ability to either take short positions or in choosing
the scale for their investments arbitrarily large.
We deduce from (25) that, even in the absence of market inefficiencies and even with only two
dates, prices may differ from fundamental values by a bubble component, identified with β. For a
correct interpretation of the economic role of bubbles, let us recall the seminal contribution of Gilles
and Leroy [37] who, in an ambient space of bounded sequences interpret deterministic bubbles as
the non summable part of the asset payoff. As such, bubbles are in fact the price of the tail part of
the asset discounted payoff. We can support the same interpretation here by virtue of the inequality∣∣β (X¯(θ))∣∣ ≤ lim
n
{
pi
((
X¯(θ)+ − n)+)+ pi ((X¯(θ)− − n)+)}(27)
By (27), β
(
X¯(θ)
)
is rightfully viewed as the component of the price of θ which only depends on
the event
{∣∣X¯(θ)∣∣ ≥ n} for all n ∈ N, i.e. on the extreme fluctuations of the portfolio discounted
payoff. Observe that necessarily the nume´raire price admits no bubbles. (27) suggests in addition
that, like in other models, bubbles are related to the limit of the price of a CALL option as the
strike price increases to infinity. This finding is consistent with similar conclusions linking the
existence of asset bubbles to some mispricings of options (see [20] and [43]). Assuming some form
of monotone continuity of the pricing functional, as in [19], excludes the existence of bubbles.
The following example illustrates the economic role of bubbles in a special case.
Example 6 (Efficient Bubbles). Consider a market on which X¯(θ) ≥∗ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ and assume
that q(θ) = X(θ)∗ −X(θ)∗. The price function is clearly subadditive and positively homogeneous.
Given that q(θ) ≥ 0 for all θ ∈ Θ it is coherent too although it will be inefficient in general. From
Lemma 4 we know that pic(1) = 0. Assume that X0,∗ = 0 and X∗0 = 1 and that, for each n ∈ N there
exists θn ∈ Θ with X(θn) = a+X02−n with a > 0. Then, X¯(θn) ≥ a+2−n so that X¯(θn)∗ ≥ a+2−n.
On the other hand X(θn)∗ = a and X(θn)∗ = a+ 2−n. But then q0 = 1 while
(28) pi(1) = inf
X¯(θ)∗>0
q(θ)/X¯(θ)∗ ≤ inf
n
(1 + a2n)−1 = 0
Thus the nume´raire is priced inefficiently and, from (25), the only possible non null efficient price
is a bubble.
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6. Option Pricing
In this section we apply our preceding results to option pricing, under the only assumption that
option are traded anonymously (i.e. that (6) holds) and at non negative prices. X > 0 will be
hereafter the payoff of a given underlying and K(X) the set of strike prices (including k = 0) of all
CALL options written on it. The ticker of each of these options, the corresponding strategy and
price will be indicated by αX(k) ∈ A, θX(k) ∈ Θ and qX(k) respectively. Define also
(29) AX = {αX(k) : k ∈ K(X)} and ΘX = {θ ∈ Θ : θ ≥ 0 and θ(α) = 0 whenever α /∈ AX}
(30) piX(h) = inf
{
λq(θ) : λ
X(θ)
X ∧ 1 ≥∗ h, λ > 0, θ ∈ ΘX
}
h ∈ F(Ω)
and
(31) KX = {h ∈ F(Ω) : piX(|h|) <∞}
Observe that the restriction of q to ΘX is coherent, given our assumption of non negative prices.
On the other hand, the change of nume´raire implicit in (30) entails a different concept of efficiency.
In particular we shall say that options are priced efficiently if
(32) qX(k) = piX
(
X(θX(k))
X ∧ 1
)
k ∈ K(X)
The criterion adopted in (32) is indeed quite weak as, for example, it does not involve PUT
options nor Futures or short positions. This is desirable since the larger the set of derivatives
involved the more likely is it that efficiency may fail. For example, the PUT/CALL parity is well
known to generate a large number of violations as well as the lower bound for CALL options8.
Define the set9
(33) Γ =
{
f ∈ F(R+) : f ≥ 0 = f(0), f convex, lim
n→∞ f(n)/n <∞
}
and observe that
(34) g0t (x) = (x− t)+ x ∈ R+
defines an element of Γ for all t ≥ 0: let G0 be the corresponding collection. Of course, it is
possible to write other derivatives on X possessing some of the properties of options. In particular,
we denote by G the family of all collections G = {gt : t ∈ R+} such that gt ∈ Γ and
(35) αgs + (1− α)gu ≥ gt whenever α ∈ [0, 1], s, t, u ∈ R+ and αs+ (1− α)u ≤ t
To start discussing the issue of options efficiency, denote by J(X) ⊂ K(X) the subset of strike
prices k possessing the following property
(36) qX(k) ≤ inf {aqX(k1) + (1− a)qX(k2) : k1, k2 ∈ K(X), 0 ≤ a ≤ 1, ak1 + (1− a)k2 ≤ k}
8Cerreia et al. [18] construct a pricing model for markets which are assumed to satisfy the PUT/CALL parity.
9The limit appearing in (33) exists by convexity.
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i.e. which satisfy the butterfly spread condition. One should remark that in the present setting this
is not an arbitrage restriction. In the rest of this section we shall adopt the following
Assumption 5. Let
(
X1{X≤j}
)∗
= j < X∗ for each j ∈ J(X).
The first part of Assumption 5 states that the points included in J(X) are not points of dis-
continuity for X; the second one that each option with strike in J(X) is not out of the money a
priori.
It turns out that CALL options are efficient if and only if they satisfy the butterfly restriction.
Lemma 5. ΘX is priced efficiently if and only if K(X) = J(X).
Carr and Madan [14], assuming the existence of an infinite collection of strike prices, obtain a
result similar to the necessity claim in Lemma 5.
We turn now to the issue of derivatives which may be super hedged exactly. Of course, efficiency
is important to this end as super hedging only involves options which are priced efficiently: from
this perspective, inefficiency is thus comparable to market incompleteness. The next result shows
that derivatives on X with payoff in Γ may hedged perfectly.
Theorem 6. For each G ∈ G and t ∈ R+ there is θGX(t) ∈ ΘX such that
(37)
X(θGX(t))
X ∧ 1 ≥∗
gt(X)
X ∧ 1 and q
G
X(t) ≡ q(θGX(t)) = piX
(
gt(X)
X ∧ 1
)
In Lemma 6 we show how to compute θGX(t) and q
G
X(t) explicitly. When setting G = G
0 as in
(34), the corresponding quantities will be indexed by 0 rather than G0, for simplicity.
The following is the most important result of the paper.
Theorem 7. Each G ∈ G admits βG(X) ≥ 0 and νGX ∈ ca(B(R+))+ such that
(38) qGX(t) = β
G(X) +
∫ ∞
t
νGX(x > z)dz for all t ≥ 0
Observe that, by standard rules,
(39)
∫ ∞
t
νGX(x > z)dz =
∫
(x− t)+dνGX(x)
Thus (38), represents the price of the G derivatives as the sum of a bubble part and the funda-
mental value. Observe that necessarily
(40) βG(X) = lim
t→∞ q
G
X(t)
so that, upon choosing G = G0, the term β0(X) represents the option price as the strike approaches
infinity and contributes to explaining the overpricing of deeply out of the money CALL’s often
documented empirically in some form of the smile effect.
The representation obtained in (38) is akin in principle to (25) but much clearer. The difference
is that the option portfolio θGX(t) is priced efficiently by construction. One deduces immediately
the following:
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Corollary 1. Option prices are efficient if and only if there are β0(X) ≥ 0 and ν0X ∈ ca(B(R+))+
such that
(41) qX(k) = β
0(X) +
∫ ∞
k
ν0X(x > z)dz for all k ∈ K(X)
In Corollary 1 sufficiency is an easy consequence of the fact that the pricing formula (41), which
holds in general only if k ∈ J(X), is convex in the strike price and of Lemma 5.
The first remarkable implication of Theorem 7 is that it provides a fully explicit CALL function,
qGX , and that this is entirely market based. In empirical analyses the estimation of the CALL
function, dictated by optimal statistical criteria, does not guarantee a direct market interpretation,
although estimates may possess several additional regularity properties that qGX may fail to exhibit.
A second fact arising from (38) is the representation of option prices via a countably additive
measure νGX to which we refer as the probability implicit in option prices although it is clear that
this will in general not be unique but may vary with the choice of the collection G. While such
multiplicity does not diminishes the significance of Theorem 7 it would be desirable to investigate
the role of G more in depth.
Given (38) we may compute
(42) νGX(x > t) = −
dqGX(k)
dk
∣∣∣∣
k=t
for all t ≥ 0
as originally suggested by Breeden and Litzenberger [13] and Banz and Miller [4]. Let us remark,
for the sake of comparison and clarity, that in the model of Black and Scholes, equation (42) gives
the familiar result
(43) νBSX (x > k) = e
−rTΦ(d2) with d2 =
ln(S0/k) + (r − 12σ2)T
σ
√
T
so that ‖νBSX ‖ = exp(−rT ). In more general, traditional models, comparing the investment in
a CALL option with strike k and in a zero coupon bond with an investment in the underlying,
efficiency implies the classical bounds for the CALL price, qX ≥ qX(k) ≥ qX − kq0, from which
follows the inequality ‖νX‖ ≤ q0 ≤ 1. However, in a model in which the nume´raire asset is not free
of risk such constraints on option prices need no longer hold. In particular, we do not have any a
priori bound to impose on the norm of νX . If, however, we assume in addition X ≥∗ η, we then
obtain
‖ν0X‖ = ν0X(x > 0) = lim
k→0
q0X(0)− q0X(k)
k
≤ piX(1) ≤ qX(0)
η
A final remark concerns the general treatment of price inefficiency and of the bid/ask spread in
empirical analysis. In most studies a great amount of preliminary work is devoted to cleaning the
dataset from price quotes which utterly violate some basic arbitrage opportunity, often amounting
up to 30% of the sample. Theorem 7 illustrates an approach which allows to obtain the same result
endogenously with no preliminary purging of the data. In this respect our method is similar to that
of Aı¨t-Sahalia and Duarte [1, pp. 16-18] who replace the original prices by weighted least squares
approximations under shape restrictions. For what concerns the bid/ask spread, the common
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approach is to restore price uniqueness by working with mid prices. We argue that this may in
principle introduce distortions in the analysis. To wit, if we assume that the options market is
efficient and given the inclusion ΘX ⊂ Θ∗, one concludes from (24) that for each θX(k) ∈ ΘX
the corresponding mid price may be represented as a risk neutral price qm(k)(θX(k)) for some
m(k) ∈M 10. However, microstructure effects may induce m(k) to depend on k in a relevant way
so that the derivative of the mid option price with respect to the strike may not distinguish between
the probability of the event {X > k} and the distortion of the intervening pricing measure as the
strike changes. As a matter of fact, market makers adjust the bid/ask spread in response to market
pressure. This is the so-called inventory and adverse selection effects, well documented in the
microstructure literature. Huang and Stoll [44], e.g., explicitly model the impact of past trading
on changes of the mid prices11. Another recent paper addressing the structure of the inventory
holding cost is Bollen, Smith and Whaley [9], who document the impact of liquidity on such costs
through the expected time to offsetting trades.
7. Estimating the CALL function
The first step in the direction of implementing Theorem 7 empirically is to choose the collection
G ∈ G ; the second, to compute the quantity qGX(t) explicitly. We solve the latter first.
Lemma 6. Let Assumption 5 hold, choose f ∈ Γ and write (i) fˆ = f(X∗) and di = (X∗ − ji) if
X∗ <∞ or else (ii) fˆ = limn f(n)/n and di = 1. Write also jI+1 = X∗
q =

qX(j0)
qX(j1)
...
qX(jI)
 , f =

f(j1)
f(j2)
...
f(jI)
fˆ

, D =

(j1 − j0) 0 . . . 0
(j2 − j0) (j2 − j1) . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
(jI − j0) (jI − j1) . . . 0
d0 d1 . . . dI

(44)
and w = D−1f . The following programs are mutually equivalent
(45) min
{θ∈ΘX , λ>0}
λq(θ) subject to λ
X(θ)
X ∧ 1 ≥∗
f(X)
X ∧ 1
(46) min
a∈RI+1+
qTa subject to Da ≥ f
and admit as their unique solution
(47) qX(f) = q
Tw and θX(f) = [θX , θX(j1), . . . , θX(jI)]w
Moreover, w[1] = f(j1)/j1 and
(48) w[i] = sup
x∈R+,x≤ji
f(x)− f(ji−1)
x− ji−1 −
f(ji−1)− f(ji−2)
ji−1 − ji−2 i = 2, . . . , I + 1
10Efficiency is necessary to guarantee that the mid price falls in the interval [pi(X¯(θX(k))), pi
c(X¯(θX(k)))]
11See e.g. equation (3), p. 1000.
20 GIANLUCA CASSESE
For what concerns the choice of G, it is natural to start with the family G0 . By construction
q0X(k) represents the efficient price of the corresponding option and so it coincides with qX(k) if and
only if k ∈ J(X). More generally one sees that the function q0X is the highest among the positive,
convex and decreasing curves passing through the knots {(j, qX(j) : j ∈ J(X)}. Aı¨t-Sahalia and
Duarte [1] obtain the same values in the first step of their approach by exploiting a least square
projection technique due to Dykstra [29]. On the data so transformed they apply then a local
polynomial regression, a methodology which generalizes suitably the kernel by replacing constant
functions with polynomials of arbitrary but preassigned degree.
By Lemma 6 we obtain
θ0X(k) =
I−1∑
i=0
bi(ji+1 − k)+ + bI gˆ0k
where the vector b is defined as in (74) and either gˆ0k = (X
∗ − k)+ if X∗ < ∞ or else gˆ0k = 1. For
definiteness let’s assume X∗ =∞. Then, by (74),
(49) ν0X(x > t) =
qX(jn)− qX(jn+1)
jn+1 − jn if jn+1 > t ≥ jn or ν
0
X(x > t) = 1 if t ≥ jI
In other words, the implied set function ν0X coincides – not surprisingly – with the right derivative
of the price function over the discrete set J(X) upon a change of sign.
Despite being a theoretically exact formula, the informational content of (49) is indeed quite
poor empirically, as a consequence of the limited number of options which are priced efficiently
by the market – the size of J(X). In fact ν0X(x > t) remains constant within two adjacent strike
prices in J(X) or, equivalently, the efficient CALL function q0X(k) is piecewise linear. Adding the
fictitious efficient prices q0X(k) to the original data set, thus, does not improve our knowledge of
νX . A quick look at (47) reveals that this follows from options payoffs being piecewise linear.
Obtaining smooth estimates is the goal of all econometric exercises. Although the review of the
different approaches followed in the literature is beyond our scopes (interested readers should refer
to Garcia, Ghysels and Renault [35]), we have a special interest here for nonparametric methods,
nicely reviewed by Yatchew [67].
A forerunner of this stream of studies is the paper by Jackwerth and Rubinstein [46] where the
parameters of a binomial tree are set so as to minimize the distance with actual option prices
given a penalty for deviations from an initial a priori distribution. The absence of arbitrage
assumption is absolutely crucial here and estimating the option price produces simultaneously
an estimate of the risk neutral measure. Aı¨t-Sahalia and Lo [2] estimate the CALL function
using the Nadaraya-Watson kernel and recover the risk-neutral density via the second derivative.
This methodology has optimal asymptotic properties but relatively poor performance in small
samples, a fact common to many non parametric methods and of special concern for options market.
The curse of dimensionality problem, see [67, p. 675], requires to limit as much as possible the
number of state variables. The risk neutral density estimated via kernel smoothing, e.g., need
not be non negative in small samples [2, footnote 11, p. 508]. To circumvent this problem the
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authors propose a semi nonparametric approach in which the price is computed according to the
Black and Scholes formula in which the volatility function is estimated non parametrically. This
choice has the clear advantage of guaranteeing the correct shape of the CALL function. Shape
restrictions are easily accommodated in parametric modeling but are much more troublesome in
the non parametric approach. Papers implementing the nonparametric methodology with shape
restrictions are less numerous and more recent. Further to Aı¨t-Sahalia and Duarte [1] another
example of non parametric techniques incorporating shape restrictions is the paper by Yatchew
and Ha¨rdle [68] who follow a least squares approach in Sobolev spaces. Among papers applying
spline techniques to option pricing one should mention Fengler [32] and Yin, Wang and Qi [69].
Although the method followed hereafter is nonparametric, it is radically different from those
adopted by the aforementioned papers as we do not look for smooth estimates of option prices
but rather exact, super hedging prices of smooth derivatives on X. The advantage in doing so, we
believe, is that our estimates maintain a stronger than usual economic interpretation12. Our first
step is then to construct a family Gh ∈ G of derivatives written on X each having a payoff, denoted
by ghk (X), (i) conveniently close to the corresponding CALL option but (ii) twice continuously
differentiable. The latter property guarantees that the corresponding price qhX(k) will be a smooth
function. The class Gh of derivatives will depend on a control parameter, h > 0, which acts in
much the same way as the bandwidth parameter in kernel regression. We give now a more detailed
description.
7.1. The General Approach. Let k, h > 0 be given. Divide the interval [−h, h] into N − 1
intervals of equal length, with endpoints T h = {−h = th1 < . . . < thN = h}, the set of knots. Let
T hk = {k + t : t ∈ T h}. Consider then the following functional (with D2f denoting the second
derivative of f):
(50) Ik(h; f) ≡
N∑
i=1
[
g0k(k + t
h
i )− f(k + thi )
]2
+ λh3
∫ k+h
k−h
[
D2f(x)
]2
dx
and the program
(51) Ik(h) ≡ min
f∈Γ∩ C 2
Ik(h; f)
It is well known, see [31, Theorem 5.2], that a solution to this problem is given by a C 2 cubic spline
which is linear outside of [k − h, k + h]. Based on the fact that the second derivative of a cubic
spline is locally linear, the infinite dimensional problem (51) conveniently reduces to a (2N − 2)-
dimensional one. Turlach [66] developed a methodology to compute its solution under several
shape restrictions such as (i) f,Df,D2f ≥ 0, i.e. positivity, monotonicity and convexity. To these
constraints we add the following: (ii) f(x) = Df(x) = 0 for x ≤ k − h, (iii) f(k + h) = g0k(k + h)
12An exception to this conclusion is the XMM methodology proposed by Gagliardini, Gourieroux and Renault [34]
where the GMM is applied with the additional constraint of reproducing a subset of given prices which are considered
a priori to be correct
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and (iv) Df(x) = 1 for x ≥ k + h. Denote
(52) χ(k;h) =
{
f ∈ C 2(R+) : f cubic spline meeting the constraints (i)− (iv)
}
To our purposes the choice of the set of knots plays little role, so we fix N = 5. The existence of
a constrained solution to (51) and the properties of such solution are proved in the next:
Lemma 7. The problem (51) under constraints (i)–(iv) admits one and only one solution, denoted
by ghk ∈ χ(k;h). Let Gh = {ghk : k ∈ R+}. Then, (i) ghk+m(x) = ghk (x −m) for all k,m, x ≥ 0 (so
that Gh satisfies (35)), (ii) g0k ≤ gh
′
k ≤ ghk whenever h′ ≤ h and (iii) limh→0 supx(ghk − g0k)(x) = 0.
Actually, in the proof of Lemma 7 we obtain in addition
(53) gh
′
k (x) = g
h
k
(
k + (x− k) h
h′
)
h′
h
so that property (iii) follows easy from
0 ≤ qhX(a)− q0X(a) ≤ piX
(
gha(X)− g0a(X)
X ∧ 1
)
≤ g
h
a(a)
(a− h) ∧ 1qX(0) ≤
gh0a (a)
(a− h0) ∧ 1
qX(0)
h0
h(54)
The content of Lemma 7 are clearly illustrated in Figure 1, Panels A and B.
[Figure 1 about here.]
Figure 1, Panel C illustrates the classical trade-off between smoothness and goodness of fit
associated with the choice of the bandwith h. A large value of h makes the smoothing interval
[k − h, k + h] larger and increases, as a consequence, the distance between g0l and ghk . At the same
time the number of efficiently priced options with strike price included in such interval, i.e. the size
of the set [k − h, k + h] ∩ J(X), grows. This makes the super hedging of the corresponding payoff
more smooth, as is clearly illustrated by the piecewise linear curves dominating the corresponding
payoff. In particular, in Panel C of Figure 1 we assume to have 6 equally spaced efficient strike
prices ranging from 95 to 105. Thus, in the case h = 2, the super hedging portfolio only contains
3 options while for the case h = 10 it contains all 6. As a general rule the super hedging portfolio
contains 1 element more than the set [k−h, k+h]∩ J(X). This suggests to choose h as a function
of the mesh M of the set J(X). In particular we suggest h = δM with δ ≥ 2 so that super hedging
will involve at least 3 options. A further advantage in so doing is that this guarantees uniform
convergence of ghk to g
0
k as, by (53),
7.2. Properties of the Estimator. A different and more classical question, somewhat extraneous
to our model but crucial to the empirical option pricing literature, is whether the proposed estimator
converges to the true price function in the presence of disturbance. The classical formulation, which
requires a reference probability measure P on a σ algebra F of subsets of Ω, is
(55) qX(ki) = F (ki) + εi ki ∈ K(X)
where F is the model and is often taken to be a positive, decreasing, convex, C 2 function whereas
the errors εi are identically and independently distributed with zero expectation.
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Lemma 6 gives an explicit functional form to our estimator:
(56) qhX(a) =
∑
j∈J(X)
wha(j)qX(j)
with wha(j) an element of the vector w obtained after choosing f = g
h
a . Thus, w
h
a(j) ≥ 0 and, at
least in the case in which X∗ =∞ as we assume henceforth, ∑j∈J(X)wha(j) = 1.
At first sight (56) defines a local averaging estimator for which a well established theory suggests
(see e.g. [67, p. 677]) that the MSE converges to 0 as the sample size diverges. However the
sample J(X) on which it is based is obtained after removing from the original sample K(X) those
prices which are not efficient. This selection mechanism introduces a strong form of correlation
between weights and disturbances. A high value of εi makes the price qX(ki) inefficient, affecting
the selection. Not only, but a high value of εi′ is likely to make option with strike ki relatively
more efficient and thus to increase the value of the corresponding weight. After Heckman [42] it
is known that sample selection may lead to biased and inconsistent estimates unless correcting for
a term which proxies the expected value of disturbances conditional on selection. The same issue
has been recently addressed by Das et al. [21] in the nonparametric setting13.
One easily deduces, from comparison with [21, equation (2.6)], that a special feature of (56) is
that the selection of an option price depends not just on variables pertinent to that option but to
the whole sample. On the other hand, the weights wha(i) are just a function of the subsample J(X),
(48). It is thus natural to follow a two step procedure (similarly to Heckman and to Das et al.)
by first conditioning variables on the selection mechanism and then focusing on the unconditional
properties. It is useful to remark to this end that for every subset z of K(X) the condition J(X) = z
identifies a measurable set, given the selection mechanism (36). Let A ⊂ F be the corresponding
(finite) σ algebra and denote by Pz(·) the conditional expectation given the event J(X) = z, for
z ⊂ K(X)14. The variable Pz(ε) will be our correction term.
Theorem 8. Let F : R+ → R+ in (55) be of class C 2 and assume that P (εi) = P (εiεj) = 0 for
i, j = 1, 2, . . . with i 6= j and
Pz(εi) = Pz(εi′) P
(
sup
i
Pz(ε
2
i )
)
<∞ Pz(εiεj) = Pz(εi′εk′)(57)
for all z ⊂ K(X) and i, i′, k, k′ ∈ z. Then, for any compact interval I ⊂ R+
(58) lim
M→0
sup
a∈I
P
(
(qhX(a)− F (a))2
)
= 0
13 Let us mention incidentally that, although the sample selection issue is fully apparent in our approach, it is
not less important in virtually all other approaches to empirical option pricing in which, before moving to estimates,
data are filtered to remove or transform observations which utterly violate some of the shape restrictions dictated by
the theory. The sample selection problem is generally dismissed by presenting data cleaning as totally unrelated to
the property of the model.
14 The symbol P (f) will denote hereafter the expectation of f with respect to P .
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Condition (57).(i) is akin to the assumption made by Das et al. that the conditional expectation
of the disturbance given selection depends only on the propensity score, see [21, Assumptions 2.1,
2.2 and 2.3]. Condition (57).(ii) is easily satisfied if, e.g., disturbances are uniformly distributed.
Thus the most delicate property in (57) seems to be the last one. Remark, eventually, that an
increase in the sample size, i.e. in the size of the set K(X), does not guarantee in general that the
size of J(X) increases as well and thus that M → 0.
8. Empirical Applications
In this section we are going to test our methodology in three different ways. First, we consider
the classical model of Black and Scholes and verify how close we get to it for a given choice of h.
The exercise is then repeated upon adding a liquidity smile. Second, introducing a simulated, noise
component we construct then confidence intervals. Eventually, we analyze briefly market data.
8.1. Black and Scholes. We set – as in Aı¨t-Sahalia and Duarte [1] – the current underlying
price at 1, 365, maturity equal to 3 months, the interest rate at 4% and assume no dividends. We
consider 25 strike prices equally spaced between 1, 000 and 1, 700, so that M = 28. We use the
same values of that paper for reasons of comparison. We experiment three possible values of the
smoothing parameter h = δM , namely δ = 2, δ = 5 and δ = 10. Volatility is set at 40%. The
CALL function obtained and the implicit probability extracted from it are plotted in Figure 2. In
panel A we represent the difference qhX(k)− qB&SX (k) and note that, for all choice of h, the smooth
option price is indeed quite near to the Black and Scholes one (which ranges from 388.54 to 42.38).
In Panel B we consider the same approximation from the perspective of implied volatilities. The
approximation is even more precise for what concerns the implicit probability function, Panel C,
with the possible exception of the values around the extrema of the interval, where the options
available for hedging is forcefully very limited. The curve for δ = 2 is plotted on the right hand
axis.
[Figure 2 about here.]
The situation partly changes upon introducing a smile effect into the data. In particular, we let
volatility decrease linearly with k, from 40% to 20%. Of course, the Black and Scholes implicit
probability, νB&S , changes accordingly to incorporate the effect of the strike on volatility. The
comparison is described in Figure 3. The price associated with the smooth options is now slightly
farer away from the true price, particularly for options just out of the money. This phenomenon,
quite limited, soon disappears when we move from δ = 10 to δ = 5. Deviations from the Black and
Scholes benchmark are more interesting when considering the implicit probability as the smooth
functions (deviations) lie below 0 up to 1460 for all choices of h.
[Figure 3 about here.]
8.2. Monte Carlo Simulation. Still inspired by Aı¨t-Sahalia and Duarte [1], we consider, on the
top the Black & Scholes model with smile, a bid ask structure with noise. In particular, we fix the
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basis spread equal to 10% of the option price with a floor at 50 cents and a cap at 2 dollars. The
resulting price is denoted by qa and represents the correct ask price. We proxy liquidity of options
via the factor `(k) = 1 + 5| exp(rτ)k/S0 − 1| which is 1 for options exactly at the money and gets
as high as 2.3 for deeply in and out of the money options. Liquidity is multiplied by a noise factor
which is uniformly distributed on the interval centered at the origin and with width equal to the
spread. The noise reflects the random arrival of flow orders to market makers inducing them to
modify the theoretical ask and bid price to reflect market pressure. We simulate 5, 000 vectors of
25 noisy prices, one for each quoted strike. For each s = 1, . . . , 5000 the resulting price is thus
qsX(k) = qX(k) + 0.5spread(1 + εs`(k))
The introduction of noise produces a number of arbitrage violations which on average amount to
25% of the sample but ranges up to 48% and is above 30% in the 20% of cases. For any simulation
s = 1, . . . , 5000 we compute, via Lemma 6, the corresponding CALL function qh,sX (k) and the
associated probability νh,sX for different values of h, although we only plot h = M . For each strike
price k, we then compute the 2.5%, the 97.5% quantiles and the mean for the simulated samples
{qh,sX (k)}5000s=1 and {νh,sX (x > k)}5000s=1 . In Panel A of Figure 4 we plot the results so obtained for the
case δ = 2 as differences from the theoretical price qa. The corresponding outcomes for the implied
volatility and probability are plotted (in absolute terms) in Panel B and C. It is noteworthy that
the true value always falls inside the confidence interval, suggesting that our approach produces
quite reliable predictions. One may also notice that the two confidence bounds are not symmetric,
especially for options deep in the money, reflecting a sort of negative skewness. The same plots
relatively to the choice δ = 10 appear in Figure 5.
[Figure 4 about here.]
Comparing Figures 4 and 5 illustrates how a high value of δ determines smoother estimates and
a narrower confidence interval, although the distance with respect to the model increases as well.
[Figure 5 about here.]
In the literature much emphasis is on the state price density rather than on the implicit proba-
bility so that the focus is actually on the second derivative of the CALL function. We do not pursue
this exercise here, partly because the presumption that a density actually exists has no financial
basis. In part, however, it is our choice to work with cubic splines that limits our ability to explore
densities. Second derivatives in fact exist but are piecewise linear, making the candidate density
function not particularly interesting for applications. Working with splines of higher order than
three is of course a possible way out but would certainly make our results much less manageable.
8.3. Market Data. Eventually, we consider an application to market data by selecting an arbitrary
trading day – 21st October 2010 – on the S&P 500 options market15. We sample ask quotes at
time intervals of one minute each and disregard quotes for which the reported ask size is below
15 We make use of the quote prices provided by CBOE Market Data Retrieval (MDR). The dataset contains, among
other things, information on bid and ask prices and volumes. Data are sampled at a frequency of approximately 1
minute
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100. On the subsample so obtained we have options quotes for 180 different strike prices – ranging
from 50 to 2500 – and 12 possible maturities – from 22nd October 2010 to 22nd December 2012.
We focus on options expiring in November 2010 and their quotes at 12:06,12:39 and 13:03, around
the market downturn of Figure 6.
[Figure 6 about here.]
At the three selected times there are 65, 53 and 67 efficiently quoted strike prices respectively
out of 90, 75 and 99. We therefore have a relatively long cross section of strikes but a rather
high incidence of arbitrage violations (on average 30%). The large number of available strikes is
one of the advantages of working with quoted ask prices, as dictated by our model, rather than
transaction prices. We select the quoted strikes so to have the same support, ranging from 670
to 1255. At 12:39 the lesser number of strikes quoted corresponds to a larger maximum interval
between consecutive strikes, i.e. M = 70, while at the other moments strikes do not differ by
more than 25 and 30, respectively. These values influence our choice of the bandwidth parameter
h for which we select three different values: h = 70, 40, 10. As argued above, the smaller h the less
smooth will be the resulting curve. In particular, smoothness breaks down if for some x the interval
[x− h, x+ h] does not contains a quoted strike, a situation which occurs whenever h < M/2. This
is the case for h = 10 and t = 12 : 39. In the following picture we plot for each time t the curves
corresponding to the three distinct values of h.
[Figure 7 about here.]
It is clear that the loss of smoothness, as captured by the difference among the black and the
green lines, is stronger at 12:29 when the distance between quoted strikes is larger.
Eventually we plot, for the value h = 70, the first and last curve together in Figure 8
[Figure 8 about here.]
to capture the effect of the market downturn on ν. The downward shift of the curve reflects the
impact of the changes of the underlying on the implied probability. In particular, the change of
q(X) from 1181.59 to 1172.57 drives the probability of ending up in the money by, say, 10 dollars
from 42.4% to 48.2%.
These last remarks suggest to investigate the dependence of νX on the current value of the
underlying, although outside of our interests here. Another issue that would be important to
address is the time evolution of the pricing measure.
Appendix A. Mathematical Appendix
In this appendix we present some results which we used in the proofs of the main Theorems.
Auxiliary Results
Let us start with two general results.
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Theorem 9. Let Γ ⊂ F(Ω) be a convex cone and define Γ∗ = {f ∈ Γ : f∗ > −∞}. Then
supf∈Γ f∗ ≤ 1 if and only if there exists m ∈ P∗ such that
(59) Γ ⊂ L1(m) and sup
f∈Γ∗
∫
fdm ≤ 0
Proof. By assumption there is no h ∈ Γ1 = {g ∈ F(Ω) : f ≥∗ g for some f ∈ Γ} such that h ≥ 1.
Thus by [17, Proposition 1], there exists a finitely additive probability m defined on the power
set of Ω and such that Γ1 ⊂ L1(m) and
∫
hdm ≤ 0 for all h ∈ Γ1 such that h > −b for some
b ∈ R. N ∈ N∗ implies 1N ∈ Γ1 so that m(N) ≤ 0 and m ∈ ba∗. On the other hand f ∈ Γ∗
implies fn = f1{f≥f∗−2−n} ∈ Γ1 so that
∫ |f |dm = ∫ |fn|dm < ∞, i.e. f ∈ L1(m); moreover,∫
fdm =
∫
fndm ≤ 0. For the converse, suppose that f ∈ Γ and f∗ > 1. Then {f ≤ 1/2} ∈ N∗
and f ∈ Γ∗ so that 0 ≥
∫
fdm =
∫
{f>1/2} fdm ≥ 1/2, a contradiction. 
Lemma 8. Let L ⊂ F(Ω) be a vector lattice containing B. Each positive linear functional φ on
L admits the decomposition
(60) φ(f) = φ⊥(f) +
∫
fdmφ f ∈ L
where mφ ∈ ba and φ⊥ is a positive linear functional vanishing on B.
Proof. See [17, Theorem 1]. 
Theorem 10. Let L ⊂ F(Ω) be a vector lattice containing B∗, C ⊂ L a convex set containing
the origin and γ : F(L ) be ≥∗-monotone, subadditive and positively homogeneous. Then
(61) γ
(
N∑
n=1
fn
)
=
N∑
n=1
γ(fn) f1, . . . , fN ∈ C
if and only if there exist (i) a positive linear functional β on L vanishing on B∗ and (ii) m ∈ ba∗,+
such that L ⊂ L1(m)
(62) γ(h) ≥ β(h) +
∫
hdm and γ(f) = β(f) +
∫
fdm for all h ∈ L , f ∈ C
Proof. (61) holds on C if and only if it holds over the whole convex cone generated by C, by positive
homogeneity and the inclusion 0 ∈ C. Let f1, . . . , fN , g1, . . . , gK ∈ C and λ1, . . . , λN , α1, . . . , αK ∈
R be such that
∑K
k=1 αkgk =∗
∑N
n=1 λnfn. Then,
∑K
k=1 α
+
k gk +
∑N
n=1 λ
−
n fn =∗
∑K
k=1 α
−
k gk +∑N
n=1 λ
+
n fn. By (61) and ≥∗ monotonicity
K∑
k=1
α+k γ(gk) +
N∑
n=1
λ−n γ(fn) = γ
(
K∑
k=1
α+k gk +
N∑
n=1
λ−n fn
)
= γ
(
K∑
k=1
α−k gk +
N∑
n=1
λ+n fn
)
=
K∑
k=1
α−k γ(gk) +
N∑
n=1
λ+n ı(fn)
28 GIANLUCA CASSESE
i.e.
∑K
k=1 αkγ(gk) =
∑N
n=1 λnγ(fn). Thus the quantity
φ0
(
N∑
n=1
λnfn
)
=
N∑
n=1
λnγ(fn) f1, . . . , fN ∈ C, λ1, . . . , λN ∈ R
implicitly defines a linear functional on the linear span Lin(C) of C. It is easy to conclude from
(61) and subadditivity that
φ0
(
N∑
n=1
λnfn
)
= φ0
(
N∑
n=1
λ+n fn
)
− φ0
(
N∑
n=1
λ−n fn
)
= γ
(
N∑
n=1
λ+n fn
)
− γ
(
N∑
n=1
λ−n fn
)
≤ γ
(
N∑
n=1
λnfn
)
and thus that φ0 ≤ γ on Lin(C). By Hahn Banach we may thus find an extension φ of φ0 to the
whole of L such that φ ≤ pi. Given that γ is ≥∗-monotone and positive homogeneous we conclude
that φ is positive and, by Lemma 8, that it admits the decomposition (60). Write β = φ⊥ and
m = mφ. If N ∈ N∗, then 1N =∗ 0 so that 0 = φ(1N ) = β(1N ) + m(N) = m(N) i.e. m ∈ ba∗,+.
Likewise, if g ∈ L then 0 ≤ β(|g|1N ) = φ(|g|1N ) ≤ γ(|g|1N ) ≤ 0 so that β vanishes on B∗, as
claimed. The converse is obvious. 
Results from section 2
Proof of Lemma 1. In any lattice X the operation x → x− is subadditive, that is (x + y)− ≤
x− + y−. Thus, if X = {X(α) : α ∈ A} and f, g ∈ F0(X )
q(f + g) =
∑
X∈X
{
[(f + g)(X)+]a(X)− [(f + g)(X)−]b(X)}
=
∑
X∈X
{
(f + g)(X)a(X) + (f + g)(X)−(a(X)− b(X))}
≤
∑
X∈X
{
(f + g)(X)a(X) + (f(X)− + g(X)−)(a(X)− b(X))}
= q(f) + q(g)
Positive homogeneity is clear. Suppose now that f, g ∈ F0(X) satisfy fg ≥ 0 that is f(X) and
g(X) have the same sign for all X ∈ X . It is then obvious that (f + g)(X)− = f(X)− + g(X)−
from which the claim follows. 
Proof of Lemma 2. f ≥ f implies f ≥∗ f . f ≥∗ g and g ≥∗ h are equivalent to f − g ≥∗ 0
and g − h ≥∗ 0 so that f − h = (f − g) + (g − h) ≥∗ 0 by Assumption 4. Let f ≥∗ 0. Then
f − α ≥∗ 0 for all α ≤ 0 so that, from (10), f∗ ≥ 0. On the other hand, f∗ ≥ 0 means that
f + 2−n ≥∗ 0 for n = 1, 2, . . . so that f ≥∗ 0 by Assumption 4. By definition f >∗ 0 if and only
if f∗ ≥ 0 and −f 6≥∗ 0 or, equivalently, (−f)∗ 6≥ 0 i.e. f∗ > 0. Let f and b be as in (iii). The
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claim is clearly true if b is simple, by Assumption 4.(iii) and (iv). Denote by bn and bn two simple
functions such that bn ≥ b ≥ bn ≥ 0 and supω |b − bn|(ω) + |b − bn|(ω) < 2−n. Fix η > 0 and let
b(n) = bn1{f<−η} + bn1{f≥−η}. Then,
fb = (f + η)b− bη ≥ (f + η)bn1{f≥−η} + (f + η)bn1{f<−η} − bη ≥ fb(n)− 2−nη
Thus, by Assumption 4.(ii), fb ≥∗ fb(n) while fb(n) ≥∗ 0 follows from Assumption 4.(iii)–(iv)
and b(n) being simple. Let f =∗ 0, i.e. f ≥∗ 0 and −f ≥∗ 0. Then −f+,−f− ≥∗ 0, by
Assumption 4.(iv) so that −|f | ≥∗ 0; the converse is obvious. Eventually, assume that f ≥∗ 0.
Then −η1{f<−η} ≥ f1{f<−η} ≥∗ 0 so that −1{f<−η} ≥∗ 0. The last property is obvious. 
Results from section 3.
Proof of Lemma 3. The only non trivial property is subadditivity. Let a ≤ f∗ and b ≤ g∗. Then
f + g − (a+ b− 2−n) ≥∗ 0 i.e. a+ b ≤ (f + g)∗. We conclude that (f + g)∗ ≥ f∗ + g∗. But then,(
X¯(θ1)∗ ∧ 0
)
+
(
X¯(θ2)∗ ∧ 0
) ≤ (X¯(θ1)∗ + X¯(θ2)∗) ∧ 0 ≤ X¯(θ1 + θ2)∗ ∧ 0
whenever θ1, θ2, θ1 + θ2 ∈ Θ. We conclude that ρ is indeed subadditive. Let φ : Θ → R+ satisfy
(iv) and (v). If ρ(θ) =∞ the inequality ρ(θ) ≥ φ(θ) is obvious; if θ ∈ Θ∗, then X¯(θ+ ρ(θ)δ0) ≥∗ 0
so that 0 = φ(θ+ ρ(θ)δ0) ≥ φ(θ)− ρ(θ). Observe that, by (10), f − (f∗− 2−n) ≥∗ 0 so that f ≥∗ f∗
and {f − f∗ < −η} ∈ N∗ and thus µ(f − f∗ < −η) = 0 when µ ∈ ba∗. Thus, µ ∈ P∗ implies
X¯(θ) ∧ 0 ∈ L(µ) and
sup
η>0
(X¯(θ)∗ ∧ η)− η ≤ sup
η>0
∫
{X¯(θ)≥X¯(θ)∗−η}
(X¯(θ) ∧ 0)dµ ≤
∫
(X¯(θ) ∧ 0)dµ
and ∫
(−X¯(θ) ∧ 0)dµ¯ ≤ (−X¯(θ)∗ + η ∧ 0)
from which we deduce (16). 
Proof of Theorem 1. If θ ∈ Θ∗, let θ′ = θ + ρ(θ)δ0 ∈ Θ. By Lemma 2 and Assumption 3.(iii),
X¯(θ′) = X¯(θ) + ρ(θ) ≥∗ 0 t(θ′) = t(θ) + q0ρ(θ) X¯(θ′)∗ = X¯(θ)∗ + ρ(θ)(63)
Let t be coherent and θ ∈ Θ. If ρ(θ) = ∞ then (17) is trivially true; otherwise, 0 ≤ t(θ′) =
t(θ) + ρ(θ)q0. If, conversely, X¯(θ) ≥∗ 0, i.e. ρ(θ) = 0, then (17) implies t(θ) ≥ 0 so that t is
coherent.
We may restrict attention to θ ∈ Θ∗. Assume that X¯(θ)∗ + ρ(θ) > 0. Then, by (63), θ′ is an
arbitrage opportunity unless t(θ) + q0ρ(θ) > 0. (18) is thus necessary for absence of arbitrage.
Conversely, assume that t meets (18). Choose θ ∈ Θ and fix ε ≥ 0 arbitrarily but such that
X¯(θ)∗ + ρ(θ) + ε > 0. By assumption, θε = θ + [ε + ρ(θ)]δ0 ∈ Θ and X¯(θε)∗ + ρ(θε) > 0. If (18)
holds then
0 < t(θε) + q0ρ(θε) = t(θ) + [ε+ ρ(θ)]q0
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so that t(θ)+ρ(θ)q0 > −εq0 for all ε > 0. Thus t(θ)+ρ(θ)q0 ≥ 0 for all θ (so that t is coherent) and,
if X¯(θ) >∗ 0, then t(θ) = t(θ)+ρ(θ)q0 > 0. We conclude that t admits no arbitrage opportunity. 
Proof of Theorem 2. Under the current assumptions t is a convex functional. Consider the sets
H0 =
{(
X¯(θ) ∧ 0) q0 − t(θ) : θ ∈ Θ}
and H = {f ∈ F(Ω) : λh ≥∗ f for some h ∈H0, and λ ≥ 0}. If λ1, . . . , λN > 0 and θ1, . . . , θN ∈
Θ then
∑N
n=1 λn
[
(X¯(θn) ∧ 0)q0 − t(θn)
] ≤ λ [(X¯(θ) ∧ 0)q0 − t(θ)] with λ = ∑Nn=1 λn and θ =∑N
n=1(λn/λ)θ
n ∈ Θ. Moreover, hn ≥∗ fn for n = 1, . . . , N implies
∑N
n=1 hn ≥∗
∑N
n=1 fn. Thus
H is a convex cone which, by (17), contains no element f with f∗ > 1. We thus conclude from
Theorem 9 that there exists a probability µ ∈ ba∗ such that
H ⊂ L1(µ) and sup
{f∈H :inf f>−∞}
∫
fdµ ≤ 0
Moreover, if θ ∈ Θ∗ and f = (X¯(θ) ∧ 0)− t(θ) then
0 ≥
∫
{X¯(θ)>X¯(θ)∗−η}
fdµ =
∫
{X¯(θ)>X¯(θ)∗−η}
(X¯(θ) ∧ 0)dµ− t(θ) =
∫
(X¯(θ) ∧ 0)dµ− t(θ)
which proves the direct implication. The converse follows from Theorem 1 and (16). 
Results from section 4.
Lemma 9. The functional pi : F(Ω)→ R is ≥∗-monotone, positively homogeneous and satisfies
pi(X¯(θ)) ≤ q(θ) θ ∈ Θ and pi(f + g) ≤ pi(f) + pi(g)(64)
for all f, g ∈ F(Ω) for which the sum pi(f) + pi(g) is defined. Moreover, the following properties are
equivalent: (i) q is coherent, (ii) pi(0) = 0, (iii) pic(1) ≤ q0 and (iv)
(65) |pi(b)| <∞ and pi(f) + pi(b∗) ≥ pi(f + b) ≥ pi(f) + pic(b∗) for all f ∈ F(Ω), b ∈ B∗
Proof. Monotonicity, positive homogeneity and the first part of (64) are obvious properties of pi.
Assume that f, g ∈ F(Ω) are such that pi(f)+pi(g) is a well defined element of R. Thus if, say, pi(f) =
∞ then pi(f) + pi(g) =∞ and the second part of (64) is obvious. If, alternatively, pi(f), pi(g) <∞,
then there exist λf , λg ≥ 0 and θf , θg ∈ Θ such that λf X¯(θf ) ≥∗ f and λgX¯(θg) ≥∗ g so that
λ(X¯(θ′f ) + X¯(θ
′
g)) ≥∗ f + g, with λ = λf + λg and θ′f = θfλf/λ and θ′g = θgλg/λ (with the
convention 0/0 = 0). Given that, by Assumption 1, θ = θ′f + θ
′
g ∈ Θ we conclude that
pi(f + g) ≤ λq(θ) ≤ λ(q(θ′f ) + q(θ′g)) = λfq(θf ) + λgq(θg)
and, the inequality being true for all λf , λf and θf , θg as above, the second half of (64) follows.
(64) also implies pi(0) ≤ 0. It is then clear that (ii) is equivalent to (i). If θ ∈ Θ and λ ≥ 0 are
such that λX¯(θ) ≥∗ −1 then (1 + λ)X¯
(
λθ+δ0
1+λ
)
≥∗ 0 so that
pi(0) ≤ (1 + λ)q
(
λθ + δ0
1 + λ
)
≤ λq(θ) + q0
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We thus conclude that q0 ≥ pi(0) + pic(1) and so that pi(0) = 0 implies pic(1) ≤ q0. If b ∈ B∗, then
(64) implies |b|∗pi(−1) ≤ pi(b) ≤ |b|∗pi(1) so that from (iii) we deduce |pi(b)| < ∞. But then the
sums pi(f) + pi(b) and pi(f + b) + pi(−b) are well defined for each f ∈ F(Ω) and the second half
of (65) follows from (64). Conversely, by (65) we conclude that pi(0) = npi(0) for each n ∈ N and
pi(0) ∈ R so that pi(0) = 0. 
Proof of Lemma 4. If pic(1) = 0 and X¯(θ) ≥∗ 0 then q(θ) ≥ pi(−1). If X¯(θ)∗ < 0 then
X¯(θ)/|X¯(θ)∗| ≥∗ −1 and so q(θ)/|X¯(θ)∗| ≥ 0. Conversely, λX¯(θ) ≥∗ −1 and λ > 0 imply θ ∈ Θ∗
and thus q(θ) ≥ 0 so that pi(−1) ≥ 0. 
Denote by
(66) Φ(pi) = {φ ∈ F(K ) : φ positive, linear and such that φ ≤ pi}
Adopting the notation of Lemma 8 we can also write
(67) M (pi) = {mφ : φ ∈ Φ(pi)} and Φ⊥(pi) =
{
φ⊥ : φ ∈ Φ(pi)
}
Proof of Theorem 3. By Lemma 9, if q is coherent then the space K is a vector sublattice
of F(Ω) containing B∗ and pi a ≥∗-monotone, positively homogeneous and subadditive functional
on K . Fix h ∈ B∗ and consider the set Ch = {λh : 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1}. By Theorem 10 there is a
positive linear functional βh on K vanishing on B∗ and mh ∈ ba∗,+ such that K ⊂ L1(mh) and
pi(f) ≥ βh(f) +
∫
fdmh for all f ∈ K and such that pi(h) = βh(h) +
∫
hdmh =
∫
hdmh. Suppose
that g ∈ K∗. Then, g− ∈ B∗ and thus
pi(g) ≥ βh(g) +
∫
gdmh = βh(g
+) +
∫
gdmh ≥
∫
gdmh
so that mh ∈M . Conversely, if m ∈M and X¯(θ)∗ ≥ 0 then (22) implies
q(θ) ≥ pi(X¯(θ)) ≥
∫
X¯(θ)dm =
∫
X¯(θ)1{X¯(θ)>X¯(θ)∗−ε}dm ≥ [X¯(θ)∗ − ε]m(Ω) ≥ −εm(Ω)
for every ε > 0 so that q is coherent. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Choose 0 6= m0 ∈ M to be countably additive on A and write P =
m0/‖m0‖. If the sequences 〈fn〉n∈N and 〈xn〉n∈N satisfy the conditions in (ii), then,∫
fdP = lim
n
∫
fndP ≤ ‖m0‖−1 lim
n
pi(fn) ≤ −pi(1)/‖m0‖ lim
n
xn ≤ −x
so that (ii) holds. Fix P as in (ii) and, assuming that (iii) fails, pick a sequence 〈fn〉n∈N in
S (A )+ which converge to 0 in L1(P ) but such that infn pic(fn) > c for some c > 0. Write
hn = −fnpi(1)/pic(fn). Thus hn converges to 0 in L1(P ) but xn = −pi(hn)/pi(1) = 1 in contrast
with (ii). Let now P be as in (iii) and suppose that for each m ∈M we may construct a sequence
〈Fn(m)〉n∈N in A such that limn P (Fn(m)) = 0 < x(m) ≡ infnm(Fn(m)). For each such m,
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choose n sufficiently large and define hn(m) = 1Fn(m)x(m)
−1 so that
∫
hn(m)dP < 2
−n while∫
hn(m)dm ≥ 1. The convex set Hn =
{
h ∈ S (A )+ :
∫
hdP < 2−n
}
is thus such that
inf
m∈M
sup
h∈Hn
∫
hdm ≥ 1
Observe that M is convex and weak∗ compact and that Hn is convex. By the minimax Theorem
of Sion [64, Corollary 3.3], there exists then hn ∈Hn such that
pic(hn) = inf
m∈M
∫
hndm ≥ 1/2
The sequence 〈hn〉n∈N so obtained contradicts (iii). 
Lemma 10. If q is coherent then the set M defined in (22) is non empty, convex and weak∗
compact subset of ba+. Moreover, M =M (pi) (see (67)).
Proof. If q is coherent, M is non empty by Theorem 3. By (22), M (pi) ⊂M . Thus, we only need
to prove that M is closed in the weak∗ topology of ba and that M ⊂M (pi). Let m0 be an element
of the closure of M and f ∈ K . Then m0 ∈ ba∗,+ and∫
(|f | ∧ n)dm0 ≤ sup
m∈M
∫
(|f | ∧ n)dm ≤ sup
m∈M
∫
|f |dm ≤ pi(|f |)
so that the sequence 〈|f | ∧ n〉n∈N is Cauchy in L1(m0). Moreover, for all c > 016
v(m0)(|f | > c+ |f | ∧ n) ≤ v(m0)(|f | > c+ n) ≤ 1
c+ n
∫
[|f | ∧ (c+ n)]dm0 ≤ pi(|f |)
c+ n
which proves that |f |∧n converges to |f | in L1(m0) and so that f ∈ L1(m0) [28, III.3.6] . Moreover,
if f ∈ K∗ ∫
fdm0 = lim
n
∫
(f ∧ n)dm0 ≤ sup
m∈M
∫
fdm ≤ pi(f)
which proves that m0 ∈M . Observe that by Tychonoff Theorem [28, I.8.5], the set Φ(pi) is compact
in the topology induced on it by K . Let 〈mγ〉γ∈Γ be a net in M (pi) converging to m ∈M in the
weak ∗ topology of ba. For each γ ∈ Γ there exists φγ ∈ Φ(pi) such that mγ = mφγ . By moving to
a subnet if necessary we obtain that the net 〈φγ〉γ∈Γ converges in the topology induced by K to
some limit φ ∈ Φ(pi). Denote by mφ the part of φ representable as an integral, as in (60). If b ∈ B
we have, by the inclusion B ⊂ K that follows from q being coherent,∫
bdmφ = φ(b) = lim
γ
φγ(b) = lim
γ
∫
bdmγ =
∫
bdm
so that m = mφ ∈M (pi). 
16By v(m) we total variation of m as defined in [28, III.1.9].
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Results from section 5
Proof of Theorem 5. Indeed if q is coherent then M is a non empty, convex and weak∗ compact
subset of ba, by Lemma 10; moreover, if m ∈M and f ∈ K then, by (22), ∣∣∫ fdm∣∣ ≤ ∫ |f |dm ≤
pi(|f |) < ∞ so that (25) may be regarded as an implicit definition of β. Observe that from (22)
and Lemma 10 we obtain
inf
φ∈Φ(pi)
φ⊥(f) ≤ pi(f)− sup
m∈M
∫
fdm
= β(f)
≤ sup
φ∈Φ(pi)
φ⊥(f) + sup
µ∈M
∫
fdµ− sup
m∈M
∫
fdm
= sup
φ∈Φ(pi)
φ⊥(f)
(68)
Given that supφ∈Φ(pi) φ⊥(f) = 0 for all f ∈ B∗, as we showed in the proof of Theorem 3, we
conclude that β vanishes on B∗. This proves existence. To show uniqueness, suppose that β¯ and
M¯ is another pair with the same properties of β and M and for which the decomposition (25)
holds. If µ ∈ M¯ \M , then there exists f ∈ B such that supm¯∈M¯
∫
fdm¯ ≥ ∫ fdµ > supm∈M ∫ fdm
but β¯(f) = β(f) = 0, a contradiction of (25). To show that (25) is sufficient for q to be coherent,
let f ∈ K∗. Then, f− ∈ B∗ and thus β(f) = β(f+) ≥ 0 and thus
pi(f) ≥ sup
m∈M
∫
fdm ≥ f∗ sup
m∈M
‖m‖ = f∗pi(1)
Therefore, if X¯(θ) ≥∗ 0 for some θ ∈ Θ then q(θ) ≥ pi(X¯(θ)) ≥ 0 and q is coherent. 
Corollary 2. The functional β defined in (25) is positive and satisfies
(69) − lim
n
{pi(f)− pi(f ∨ −n)} ≤ β(f) ≤ lim
n
{pi(f)− pi(f ∧ n)} f ∈ K
and
(70) β(f) = lim
n
{pi(f)− pi(f ∧ n)} f ∈ K∗
Proof. Positivity of β follows from (68) and the fact that φ⊥(f) ≥ 0 for each f ∈ K∗ and φ ∈ Φ(pi).
Moreover,
sup
m∈M
∫
fdm = sup
m∈M
lim
n
∫
(f ∨ −n)m ≤ lim
n
sup
m∈M
∫
(f ∨ −n)m ≤ lim
n
pi(f ∨ −n)
Likewise, given that φ⊥(f ∧ n) ≤ 0 for all f ∈ K and φ ∈ Φ(pi) by Lemma 10
sup
m∈M
∫
fdm = lim
n
sup
m∈M
∫
(f ∧ n)dm = lim
n
sup
φ∈Φ
{φ(f ∧ n)− φ⊥(f ∧ n)} ≥ lim
n
pi(f ∧ n)
and (69) is proved. (70) follows from
β(f) = pi(f)− sup
m∈M
∫
fdm = pi(f)− sup
m∈M
lim
n
∫
(f ∧ n)dm = pi(f)− lim
n
sup
m∈M
∫
(f ∧ n)dm
and the fact that supm∈M
∫
(f ∧ n)dm = pi(f ∧ n) whenever f ∈ K∗. 
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Results from section 6
Theorem 11. If ΘX is priced efficiently then there are βX ∈ R+ and νX ∈ ca (B(R+))+ such that
(71) qX(k) = βX +
∫ ∞
k
νX(x > t)dt k ∈ K(X)
Proof. Assume that ΘX is priced efficiently as of (32). In restriction to KX the functional piX is
then ≥∗ monotonic, positively homogeneous and subadditive. Moreover, B∗ ⊂ KX . By (32) and
(6), piX is additive on the convex set CX = {X(θ)X∧1 : θ ∈ ΘX} which contains the origin. Then
Theorem 10 applies. Let φX : KX → R be the ≥∗ positive linear functional such that φX ≤ piX
and that φX = piX in restriction to CX . Observe that (X − k)+/X ∧ 1 ∈ KX for all k ≥ 0 and so
it is possible to define the function F : R+ → R+ implicitly by letting
F (k) = φX
(
(X − k)+
X ∧ 1
)
k ≥ 0
Of course, F (k) = qX(k) for all k ∈ K(X); in addition, it is decreasing and convex. By a standard
result on convex functions, we may write
(72) F (k2) = F (k1) +
∫ k2
k1
f(t)dt 0 < k1 < k2
where, for definiteness, we take f(t) to be the right derivative of F for t ∈ R+. Suppose that
{u ≥ X > t} ∈ N∗ for some 0 ≤ t < u and fix 0 < h ≤ (u − t)/2. There is then a negligible set
outside of which each of the options with strike prices t, t+ h, u− h, u expires in the money if and
only if all the others do. In other words
(X − t)+
X ∧ 1 +
(X − u)+
X ∧ 1 =∗
(X − (t+ h))+
X ∧ 1 +
(X − (u− h))+
X ∧ 1
from which it follows
F (t) + F (u) = φX
(
(X − t)+
X ∧ 1 +
(X − u)+
X ∧ 1
)
= φX
(
(X − (t+ h))+
X ∧ 1 +
(X − (u− h))+
X ∧ 1
)
= F (t+ h) + F (u− h)
Thus,
F (u)− F (u− h)
h
=
F (t+ h)− F (t)
h
i.e. the left derivative of F at u and the right derivative of F at t coincide. There exists then a set
D ⊂ R+ with R+\D at most countable and such that {X > u} 4N1 = {X > t} 4N2 for t, u ∈ D
and N1, N2 ∈ N∗ imply f(t) = f(u). It is therefore possible to define a positive set function λˆ0 on
the collection {{X > t} 4N : t ∈ D, N ∈ N∗} implicitly by letting
(73) λˆ0({X > t} 4N) = −f(t) t ∈ D, N ∈ N∗
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Since f is negative and increasing (by convexity of F ) the identities λ0(Ω) = −f(0), λ0(∅) = 0 and
(74) λ0({X > t} 4N) = sup
{u∈D:u≥t}
λˆ0(X > u) t ∈ R+, N ∈ N∗
define a positive extension λ0 of λˆ0 to the family A0(X) of subsets of Ω formed by Ω, ∅ and all
sets of the form {X > t} 4 N with t ∈ R+ and N ∈ N∗. To see that this indeed defines an
extension, observe that, if there is t∞ ∈ D such that {X > t∞} = ∅ then F (t∞ + h) = F (t∞) and
so f(t∞) = 0. Likewise, if {X > t0} = Ω for some t0 ∈ D, then {X > t0} = {X > 0} so that,
as seen above, f(t0) coincides with f(0). If either t0 or t∞ do not exist, then one can choose the
corresponding value of λ0 arbitrarily. Since the elements of A0(X) are linearly ordered by inclusion
it follows that if Ai = {X > ti} 4Ni and Ni ∈ N∗ for i = 1, 2 with t1 ≥ t2 then
λ0(A1) + λ0(A2) = λ0(X > t1) + λ0(X > t2)
= λ0({X > t1} ∩ {X > t2}) + λ0({X > t1} ∪ {X > t2})
= λ0(A1 ∩A2) + λ0(A1 ∪A2)
as {X > t1} 4 (A1 ∩ A2), {X > t2} 4 (A1 ∪ A2) ⊂ N1 ∪ N2 ∈ N∗. It follows from [6, Theorems
3.1.6 and 3.2.10], that there exists a unique extension λ ∈ ba(A (X))+ of λ0 to the algebra A (X)
generated by A0(X) and thus such that λ(N) = 0 when N ∈ N∗. Let
(75) βX = lim
k→∞
F (k)
Then we obtain from (72)
βX = F (k)−
∫ ∞
k
λ(X > t)dt k ≥ 0
To eventually get (71), write
A =
{
A ⊂ R+ : X−1(A) ∈ A (X)
}
It is clear that A is an algebra containing the algebra A (R+) generated by the left open intervals
of R+. Define then λX ∈ ba(A (R+)) by letting λX(A) = λ(X ∈ A) and observe from (72) that∫
R+ λX(x > t)dt = −
∫
R+ f(t)dt ≤ F (0) so that limt λX((t,∞)) = 0. Exploiting standard rules of
the Lebesgue integral and integration by parts we obtain∫
R+
λ(X > t)dt =
∫
R+
λX(x > t)dt =
∫
R+
xdλX(x) =
∫
xdλX(x)
as λX(x < −t) = 0 for all t ≥ 0. It follows from [27, Lemma 2, p. 191] that, uniquely associated
with λX is its conventional companion νX ∈ ca(A (R+))+ with the property that
(76)
∫
h(x)dλX =
∫
h(x)dνX
for any continuous function h : R→ R for which either integral is well defined. The extension from
A (R+) to the generated σ algebra B(R+) is standard. Thus the representation (71) is implicit in
ΘX being priced efficiently. Suppose that βˆX ≥ 0 and νˆX ∈ ca(B(R+))+ is another pair for which
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the representation (71) holds. Then, βX − βˆX =
∫∞
k [νˆX(x > t)− νX(x > t)]dt for all k ≥ 0 which
implies βX = βˆX . 
Proof of Lemma 5. The direct implication is obvious. For the converse, assume that qX(k) pos-
sesses the mentioned properties and thatK(X) = J(X). Represent θ ∈ ΘX as θ =
∑
j∈J(X) θjθX(j).
From Lemma 6 in the Appendix we know that there exists θ∗ =
∑
j∈J(X) θ
∗
j θX(j) ∈ ΘX such that
X(θ∗)
X ∧ 1 ≥∗
X(θ)
X ∧ 1 and q(θ
∗) = piX
(
X(θ)
X ∧ 1
)
Moreover, from (47) and (79) we conclude that for n = 0, . . . , I − 1
n∑
i=0
θ∗i =
∑
i≤n θi(jn+1 − ji)−
∑
i≤n−1 θi(jn+1 − ji)
jn+1 − jn =
n∑
i=0
θi
and θ∗I = θI so that θ = θ
∗ and thus q(θ) = piX(X(θ)/(X ∧ 1)). ΘX is thus priced efficiently. 
Proof of Theorem 7. The existence of θX(gt) satisfying (37) is proved in Theorem ?? in the
Appendix. Consider the function t→ qGX(t). It is clear that qGX(t) ≥ 0 and that, when a, t, u, z are
as in (35) then
qGX(z) = piX
(
gz(X)
X ∧ 1
)
≤ piX
(
agt(X) + (1− a)gu(X)
X ∧ 1
)
≤ apiX
(
gt(X)
X ∧ 1
)
+ (1− a)piX
(
gu(X)
X ∧ 1
)
= aqGX(t) + (1− a)qGX(u)
Each qGX(t) may equivalently be viewed as the fictitious price of a CALL option written on X with
strike price t. Such artificial options market would then be priced efficiently, as the corresponding
CALL function clearly satisfies the conditions of Lemma 5, with KG(X) = R+. But then, the
representation (38) follows directly from Theorem 7. 
Results from section 8
Lemma 11. The functional piX defined in (30) and acting on KX is ≥∗-monotone, positively
homogenous and subadditive. Moreover, B∗ ⊂ KX and piX(1) > 0.
Proof. To show B∗ ⊂ KX it is enough to show that 0, 1 ∈ KX which is however obvious if options
have non negative prices and in view of the inequality piX(1) ≤ qX(0). Then 0 ≤ piX(|b|) ≤ b∗pi(1).
The remaining properties are obvious. 
Lemma 12. Let Assumption 5 hold, choose f, g ∈ Γ and let either (i) fˆ = f(X∗) if X∗ < ∞ or
else (ii) fˆ = limn f(n)/n (gˆ being defined likewise). If f = X(θ) with θ ∈ ΘX , then
(77)
f(X)
X ∧ 1 ≥∗
g(X)
X ∧ 1 if and only if f(kn) ≥ g(kn) n = 1, . . . , N and fˆ ≥ gˆ
where K(X) = {kn : n = 0, . . . , N} and k0 = 0.
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Proof. If f(kn) < g(kn) − ε for some ε > 0 and n = 1, . . . , I then by continuity there exists
kn − 1 > η > 0 such that f < g − ε in restriction to the set An = {kn − η < X ≤ kn}. Likewise, if
fˆ < gˆ − ε then f < g − ε in restriction to the set A = {X > X∗ − η}, if X∗ <∞, or A = {X > t}
for some t ∈ N if X∗ =∞. By Assumption 5, however, neither An nor A belong to N∗; moreover,
X ∧ 1 = 1 on these sets so that f(X)/(X ∧ 1) ≥∗ g(X)/(X ∧ 1) is contradicted.
Conversely, if f(kn) ≥ g(kn) holds for n = 1, . . . , I, then, given that f(0) = g(0) = 0, that g
is convex and f piecewise linear, we conclude that f(x) ≥ g(x) for all 0 ≤ x ≤ X∗ and so that
f(X) ≥ g(X) and thus f(X)/(X ∧ 1) ≥∗ g(X)/(X ∧ 1). 
Proof of Lemma 6. It is, first of all, clear that in solving (45) one may restrict attention to
portfolios formed with options with strike prices in J(X). This implies that j0 = 0 and that each
λX(θ) with λ > 0 and θ ∈ ΘX in (45) may be taken to be of the form
∑I
i=0 ai(X − ji)+ so that
λq(θ) = qTa with aT = [a0, a1, . . . , aI ] ∈ RI+1+ . Write
ga(X) =
I∑
i=0
ai(X − ji)+ and gˆa =
{
ga(X
∗) if X∗ <∞
limn ga(n)/n otherwise
and observe that ga is a convex function, being a linear combination of convex functions with
positive weights. Remark also that [ga(j1), . . . , ga(jI), gˆa]
T = Da. Fix f ∈ Γ. By Lemma 12
ga(X)
X∧1 ≥∗ f(X)X∧1 is equivalent to Da ≥ f .
Define the vectors w,b ∈ RI+1 implicitly by letting
(78) bIdI = qX(jI) and bIeI +
I−1∑
i=n
bi =
qX(jn)− qX(jn+1)
jn+1 − jn n = 0, . . . , I − 1
with eI = 1 if X
∗ <∞ or else eI = 0 and
(79)
n∑
i=0
wi =
f(jn+1)− f(jn)
jn+1 − jn n = 0, . . . , I − 1 and
I∑
i=0
widi = fˆ
The following properties are easily established by induction: (i) b ≥ 0 (as j0, . . . , jI ∈ J(X)) (ii)
w ≥ 0 (as f ∈ Γ), (iii) bTD = qT and (iv) w = D−1f . But then,
min
{θ∈ΘX ,λ>0:λX(θ)≥∗f(X)}
q(θ) = min
{a∈RI+1+ :Da≥f}
qTa = min
{a∈RI+1+ :Da≥f}
bTDa ≥ bT f = qTw

Results from section 8
Proof of Lemma 7. By a result of Turlach [66, p. 85] the program (51) admits as its solution a
cubic C 2 spline of the form
ghk (x) =
5∑
i=1
1[k+thi ,k+thi+1)
(x)P hk,i
(
x− (k + thi )
)
x ∈ R+
where, as in the text, thi = (i−3)h/2 for i = 1, . . . , 5, th6 =∞ and P hk,i is a polynomial of degree 3. It
is clear from the constraints imposed to (51) that indeed ghk ∈ Γ. Moreover, these same constraints
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imply that ghk (x) = g
0
k(x) when x /∈ [k−h, k+h] while 1 ≥ Dghk (x) ≥ 0 on [k−h, k+h]. Thus, ghk−g0k
is increasing on (−∞, k] and decreasing afterwards, so that supx(ghk−g0k)(x) ≤ (ghk−g0k)(k) = ghk (k).
Moreover, the (non empty) set of solutions is clearly convex and the functional Ik(h; f) is strictly
convex in f so that the solution is necessarily unique. Define
g¯hk (x) = g
h
k (2k − x) + (x− k) x ≥ 0
One deduces from (50) that
Ik(h; g¯
h
k ) =
5∑
i=1
[g0k(k + t
h
i )− g¯hk (k + thi )]2 +
∫ k+h
k−h
D2(g¯hk (x))
2dx
=
2∑
i=1
[g¯hk (k + t
h
i )]
2 + g¯hk (k)
2 +
5∑
i=4
[g¯hk (k + t
h
i )− thi ]2 +
∫ k+h
k−h
D2(g¯hk (x))
2dx
=
5∑
i=4
[ghk (k + t
h
i )− thi ]2 + g¯hk (k)2 +
2∑
i=1
[ghk (k + t
h
i )]
2 +
∫ k+h
k−h
D2(ghk (x))
2dx
= Ik(h; g¯
h
k )
However, since the solution is unique, we have the symmetry relation
(80) ghk (x) = g
h
k (2k − x) + (x− k) x ≥ 0
Let f ∈ χ(k;h) and let h > h′ and
Tf(x) = f
(
k + (x− k) h
h′
)
h′
h
Observe that T : χ(k;h)→ χ(k;h′) is one to one and onto and that D2Tf(x) = h/h′D2f(k + (x−
k)h/h′). Thus,
Ik(h
′;Tf) =
5∑
i=1
[g0k(k + t
h′
i )− Tf(k + th
′
i )]
2 + (h′)3
∫ k+h′
k−h′
(D2Tf(x))2dx
= (h′/h)2
5∑
i=1
[g0k(k + t
h
i )− f(k + thi ]2 + (h′)2h
∫ k+h
k−h
(D2f(z))2dz
= (h′/h)2Ik(h; f)
Thus f solves the program (51) relatively to h if and only if Tf solves it relatively to h′. By
uniqueness we conclude that (53) holds. Observe then, if x ≤ k
gh
′
k (x) = g
h
k (k + (x− k)h/h′)h′/h ≤ ghk (x)h′/h ≤ ghk (x)
a conclusion which extends to x > k by (80). This proves (ii). Given that 0 ≤ Dghk (x) ≤ 1 we
conclude that
0 ≤ gh′k (x)− g0k(x) ≤ gh
′
k (x)− g0k(x) = gh
′
k (k) =
h′
h
ghk (k)
so that ghk decreases to g
0
k uniformly in x.
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If y = k′ − k ∈ R, then
ghk (x) =
5∑
i=1
1[k′+thi ,k′+thi+1)
(x+ y)P hk,i(x+ y − (k′ + thi )) ≡ γhk (x+ y; k′)
It is obvious that γhk (x+ y; k
′) = γhk (x; k) and that g
0
k+y(x+ y) = g
0
k(x). But then, for i = 1, . . . , 5,
g0k′(k
′ + thi )− γhk (k′ + thi ; k′) = g0k(k + thi )− γhk (k + thi ; k) = g0k(k + thi )− ghk (k + thi )
and that ∫ k+h
k−h
D2γhk (x; k)
2dx =
∫ k′+h
k′−h
D2γhk (x+ y; k
′)2dx
Using the notation of (50), we conclude that
Ik(h) = Ik(h; γ
h
k (·; k)) = Ik+y(h; γhk (·; k′)) ≥ Ik′(h) k > 0, y ∈ R
The same inequality holds after exchanging k for k′ so that γhk (·; k′) and ghk′ are both C 2 splines of
degree 3 solving (51) and thus coincide, by uniqueness. We conclude that ghk+y(x) = g
h
k (x− y) and
thus, if 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 and k3 ≤ ak1 + (1− a)k2,
aghk1(x) + (1− a)ghk2(x) = aghk3(x+ (k1 − k3)) + (1− a)ghk3(x+ k2 − k3)
≥ ghk3(x+ ak1 + (1− a)k2 − k3))
≥ ghk3(x)
proving (i). 
Proof of Theorem 8. Exploiting the inclusion F ∈ C 2 we can rewrite (56) as
(81) qhX(a) = F (a)+
∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)[DF (a)(ki−a)+
1
2
D2F (a)(ki−a)2+o((ki−a)2)]+
∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)εi
From (48) we know that wha is a constant conditional on each selection z; moreover, given that
gha(x) = g
0
a(x) whenever x /∈ Br(a), the open ball of radius r around x, we conclude that wha(i) = 0
unless ki−1 < a+ h and ki+1 > a− h i.e. unless ki ∈ B(δ+1)M (a). The first sum on the right hand
side of (81) is then majorized by
|DF (a)|(δ + 1)M + 1
2
D2F (a)(δ + 1)2M2 + o((δ + 1)2M2)
On the other hand by (57).(i)
P
 ∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)εi
 = P
 ∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)Pz(εi)
 = P
Pz(ε1) ∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)
 = P (ε1) = 0
Likewise, from (48) and the fact that gha is symmetric around a we conclude that
wha(1) = o(M) and w
h
a(i) ≤
1
2
D2gha(a)M + o(M) for i > 1(82)
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so that, by (57).(ii)
P
 ∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)
2ε2i
 ≤ P
sup
i
Pz(ε
2
i )
∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)
2

≤ P
sup
i
Pz(ε
2
i )
∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)
 o(M)
≤ o(M)P
(
sup
i
Pz(ε
2
i )
)
Eventually, if i0, j0 ∈ z,
P
 ∑
{i 6=j:ki,kj∈J(X)}
wha(i)w
h
a(j)εiεj
 = P
Pz(εi0εj0) ∑
{i 6=j:ki,kj∈J(X)}
wha(i)w
h
a(j)

= P (εi0εj0)− P
Pz(εi0εj0) ∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)
2

= −P
Pz(εi0εj0) ∑
ki∈J(X)
wha(i)
2

so that, by (82), the last term is clearly less than
P (|Pz(εi0ε0j)|)O(M)
This together with continuity of D2gha proves (58). 
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Figure 1. Smoothing Option Payoff by h.
In Panel A and B we plot the payoff ghk (x) and its derivative Dg
h
k (x) for k = 100 and different
values of h. We have set λ = 0.25. In Panel C we have drawn for the cases h = 2, 10 the smooth
payoff ghk (x) together with the payoff of the portfolio superhedging it, assuming the existence of
options with strikes 97, 99, 101, 103 and 105.
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Figure 2. Deviations from Black and Scholes.
In Panel C the curve relative to δ = 2 is represented on the right hand side scale.
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Figure 3. Deviations from Black and Scholes in the Presence of a Smile Effect.
σ = 0.4− 0.2(k − 1000)/700 and νB&S = −∂qB&S /∂K − ∂qB&S /∂σ dσ /dk .
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Figure 4. Simulated 95% Confidence Intervals for the case δ = 2.
The confidence bands were obtained after 5.000 Monte Carlo simulations.
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Figure 5. Simulated 95% Confidence Intervals for the case δ = 10.
The confidence bands were obtained after 5.000 Monte Carlo simulations.
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Figure 6. The S&P 500 Index on 21st October 2010.
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Figure 7. νh(X > x) on 21st October 2010, Maturity 20th November 2010.
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Figure 8. νh(X > x) at 12:06 and 13:03 for the case h = 70.
